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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Rates of obesity and overweight in America have increased dramatically in 
recent decades, with no end to the increase in sight.1 The obesity epidemic has 
brought with it severe social costs. Obesity is a known cause of numerous fatal 
diseases and is responsible for tens of thousands of preventable deaths every year.2 It 
is also a contributing factor to the development of numerous non-fatal health and 
psychological conditions.3 Moreover, obesity significantly drains the public purse as 
a result of the billions of dollars it annually adds in increased government health care 
costs.4 
Given the seriousness of the American obesity problem, there would appear to be 
good reasons for the government to implement aggressive new policies designed to 
curb, and even reverse, the national rate of obesity. For example, “full disclosure” 
laws requiring the conspicuous posting of nutritional information, and/or health 
risks, restrictions on the advertising of unhealthy foods, government subsidies for the 
production of nutritional staples, and the institution of a “fat tax” on particularly 
unhealthy foods.5   
                                                          
 1 Prevalence of Overweight, Obesity, and Extreme Obesity Among Adults: United States, 
Trends 1976-1980 Through 2005-2006, NAT‟L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS. (2008), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/over weight/overweight_adult.pdf. 
 2 Statistics Related to Overweight and Obesity, NAT‟L INST. OF HEALTH (2008), 
http://www.win.niddk.nih.gov/statis tics/#overweight. 
 3 Id.  
 4 Id.; Ross A. Hammond & Ruth Levine, The Economic Impact of Obesity in the United 
States 9 (2010), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/articles/2010/0914_obesity_cost 
_hammond_levine/0914_obesity_cost_hammond_levine.pdf. 
 5 See, e.g., Kelly D. Brownell, The Public Health and Economic Benefits of Taxing 
Sugar-Sweetened Beverages, NEW ENG. J. MED. 1-7 (2009), available at http://www.nejm.org/ 
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While there appears to be a prima facie case for the institution of such policies—
based on the seriousness of the obesity epidemic—critics have repeatedly objected to 
these potentially effective policies on the grounds that government interference with 
the food industry would amount to government “big brother” forcing its vision of the 
good down Americans‟ collective throats.6 Such critics argue that food choices are 
an entirely private matter, and that obesity is simply a matter of personal 
responsibility. In short, they conclude that the American obesity crisis is simply none 
of the government‟s business.7  
This Article examines—and ultimately rejects—this anti-paternalism argument 
against government anti-obesity policies. It argues that government intervention in 
the food industry for the purpose of stemming the American obesity epidemic is 
justified and survives paternalistic objections to the contrary. 
This Article begins by briefly outlining the nature, severity, and causes of the 
obesity epidemic. It considers what can be done about the problem, finding that only 
government intervention is capable of effectively combating the crisis. It also 
outlines several types of potentially successful government anti-obesity strategies. 
Finally, it considers the primary topic of this Article: whether government anti-
obesity policies constitute unjustified government paternalism.      
In response to this anti-paternalism objection, this Article first notes that several 
anti-obesity policies can be justified entirely on non-paternalistic grounds. It then 
proceeds to confront the paternalism objection head-on, finding that whether 
Americans‟ unhealthy food choices should be respected depends crucially on the 
extent to which such choices are voluntary.   
If such food choices are to a significant extent less than voluntary, there is a 
strong argument for enlisting government aid in the fight against obesity. Finding 
that, contrary to common opinion, the unhealthy food choices of Americans fall 
significantly short of being fully voluntary, this Article concludes that there is a 
strong argument in favor of government intervention. This “soft” or “weak” 
paternalism strategy, which sanctions government interference only to the extent 
necessary to ensure the voluntariness of choices, supports government intervention 
into the food industry only to the extent necessary to mitigate the various factors that 
make the unhealthy food choices of persons less than fully their own. It acts in 
defense of gastronomical autonomy. 
Having concluded that many anti-obesity policies are justified on both non-
paternalism and soft paternalism grounds, this Article considers whether more 
aggressive anti-obesity policies that would override the voluntary choices of 
Americans (such as product bans) can be justified. To the extent that unhealthy food 
choices are voluntary, this paper finds that Americans can be said to have fully 
accepted the risks of their perhaps imprudent choices. In such cases, there are strong 
arguments in favor of respecting the choices made by competent adults, allowing 
individuals to bear the risks of their own choices for the greater good of individual 
                                                          
doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMhpr0905723; Soft Drink Taxes: A Policy Brief, YALE CTR. FOR FOOD 
POLICY & OBESITY (2009), available at  http://www.yaleruddcent er.org/resources/upload/ 
docs/what/reports/RuddReportSoftDrinkTaxFall2009.pdf. 
 6 See, e.g., David Boaz, Obesity and Public Health? (2004), http://www.cato.org/ 
pub_display.php? pub_id=2746 (arguing that obesity is not properly termed a “public health” 
issue, and that it is instead purely a matter of personal responsibility). 
 7 Id.   
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freedom. Thus, this paper finds that anti-obesity polices supported by a hard 
paternalism rationale are generally unjustified, subject only to a narrow “defense of 
integrity” exception.8 In short, although the paternalism objection cannot be thought 
to prohibit government anti-obesity policies, it does function to limit the 
intrusiveness of such measures. 
Finally, having found that a compelling case for the introduction of several anti-
obesity policies exists, this Article considers a second common objection to their 
implementation, that of the slippery slope. This objection contends that the adoption 
of even relatively mild anti-obesity policies will start the government down a 
slippery slope towards ever more intrusive policies; thus, it is thought that the 
government should refrain from regulating obesity altogether. Finding this slippery 
slope argument to be most unconvincing, at least in the case of anti-obesity 
regulation, this Article concludes that the overall case for government anti-obesity 
regulation is very strong indeed. 
II.  THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE AMERICAN OBESITY EPIDEMIC 
A.  Rates of Obesity and Overweight Have Reached Crisis Proportions 
A study released by the National Center for Health Statistics in 2008 found that 
32.7% of American adults were overweight, that an additional 34.3% were obese, 
and that 5.9% were extremely obese.9 The figures for children are equally (if not 
more) alarming. In a recent study, 16.9% of American children were classified as 
obese, including 19.6% of the 6-11 age bracket.10 Given these staggering statistics, 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have classified the American 
obesity problem as an “epidemic.”11   
Americans have not always been so fat. On the contrary, the explosion of obesity 
rates has occurred primarily within the past few decades.12 The percentage of obese 
adults has increased from 13.4% in the early 1960s, to 15.0% in the late 1970s, to 
23.2% in the late 1980s and early 1990s, to 30.9% at the turn of the millennium, to 
35.1% in the most recent estimate.13 For children, obesity rates have increased from 
                                                          
 8 The “argument from integrity” exception contends that when an individual endeavors to 
make a choice (1) for trivial reasons, (2) that promises insignificant benefits, and (3) such a 
choice puts in jeopardy one's core life projects, goals, or values, then (4) one may be justified 
in overriding that choice for that individual‟s own good. See, infra, § IV(C)(4)(i); JOHN 
KLEINIG, PATERNALISM 63 (1984). 
 9 Prevalence of Overweight, supra note 1. Adults ages 20 years or older are included in 
the survey. An individual is defined as overweight if they have a Body Mass Index (“BMI”) 
greater than or equal to 25.0 and less than 30.0, obese if they have a BMI greater than or equal 
to 30.0, and extremely obese if they have a BMI greater than or equal to 40.0. Id. BMI is 
calculated by finding one‟s weight in kilograms and dividing this number by the square of 
their height in meters. Id. 
 10 Prevalence of Overweight, supra note 1. Individuals are counted as children if they are 
under twenty years of age. Id. 
 11 Obesity and Overweight: A Public Health Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION (2004), www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/obesity/epidemic.htm.    
 12 Prevalence of Overweight, supra note 1.  
 13 Id.    
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5.0% in the early 1970s, to 10.0% in the late 1980s and early 1990s, to 13.9% at the 
turn of the millennium, to 16.9% in the most recent estimate.14   
The current rates of obesity in the United States are certainly unnerving, and 
there is no sign that the situation will improve any time soon.   
B.  The Obesity Epidemic Is Responsible for Severe Social Harms 
The American obesity crisis has staggering social costs. A high body fat content 
significantly increases the likelihood of developing numerous health conditions, 
including type-2 diabetes, coronary heart disease, high LDL (“bad”) cholesterol, 
hypertension, stroke, nonalcoholic fatty liver disease, gallbladder disease, 
osteoarthritis, sleep apnea and other breathing problems, several forms of cancer, 
and menstrual irregularities.15    
Because the obese and overweight are at a much greater risk of developing the 
various conditions outlined above, they also have a significantly greater risk of early 
death. Every year, at least 112,000 cardiovascular deaths, 15,000 cancer deaths, and 
over 35,000 non-cardiovascular, non-cancer deaths are attributed to obesity and 
overweight.16 In sum, obesity and overweight are jointly responsible for at least 
160,000 preventable deaths per year. 
The obese and overweight suffer from a variety of psychological problems as 
well, including depression, anxiety, low self-esteem, poor body image, and suicidal 
tendencies, with many of these stemming from widespread societal bias against the 
obese.17      
Finally, obesity and overweight add billions of dollars to annual government 
health care spending at a time when government debt is steadily increasing. 
Currently, $86-147 billion dollars per year in increased health care costs are 
attributed to the obesity crisis, with the government picking up approximately half of 
this inflated bill.18 Moreover, there are significant additional economic costs related 
to obesity, such as lost productivity and increased transportation costs (due, for 
example, to the increased fuel costs needed to transport heavier passengers).19 In 
sum, the total annual economic costs of obesity are estimated to exceed $215 
billion.20     
The costs of the American obesity epidemic are staggering, both in terms of 
individual well-being and in terms of economic dollars and cents.21 Unless effective 
anti-obesity action is taken, Americans will continue to suffer the widespread social 
and economic harms engendered by the obesity crisis.   
                                                          
 14 Id at 9.  
 15 NAT‟L INST. OF HEALTH (2008), supra note 2. 
 16 Id. 
 17 See, e.g., Weight Bias: A Social Justice Issue, YALE RUDD CTR. FOR FOOD POLICY AND 
OBESITY (2009), http://www.yaleruddcenter.org/resources/upload/docs/what/reports/Rudd 
BriefWeightBias2009.pdf. 
 18 Hammond & Levine, supra note 4, at 9. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 10.  
 21 Id. at 9. 
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C.  The Causes of the Crisis 
At the most basic level, obesity and overweight are caused by an excessive 
consumption of food; specifically, by taking in more calories than can be burned off 
by physical activity.22 The explosion in obesity rates over the past few decades has 
therefore resulted from an ever-increasing caloric imbalance, caused by dramatic 
changes in both eating and exercise habits.23    
Widespread consumption of increasingly cheap and ubiquitous low-nutritional 
food has resulted in a greater caloric intake for the average American.24 Indeed, the 
average daily caloric intake increased by 530 calories between 1970 and 2000, a 
24.5% increase.25 At the same time, the relative decrease in physically-demanding 
jobs and the concomitant increase in jobs requiring little exertion have led to a 
greater proportion of Americans leading sedentary lifestyles.26   
Increased consumption of foods with high caloric content and low nutritional 
value, in conjunction with ever-increasing sedentary lifestyles, makes for an 
environment anathema to a healthy lifestyle.27 The ubiquity of cheap, convenient, 
perpetually available, and tasty low- nutritional food juxtaposed with the sedentary 
modern lifestyle makes for a volatile situation which should make the recent 
explosion of obesity rates no surprise.28   
Indeed, unhealthy eating and sedentary living has become the societal norm.29 As 
a result, Americans can no longer simply assume that their daily life tasks will 
provide them with sufficient exercise; for most persons they will not.30 Nor can an 
individual assume that eating the most popular, economical, or convenient foods will 
                                                          
 22 NAT‟L INST. OF HEALTH, supra note 2; see also U.S. DEP‟T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVS., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR NIH OBESITY RES. (2004). The U.S. Department of Agriculture 
estimates that the average American consumes 2,700 calories per day, 700 more than 
recommended. U.S. DEP‟T OF AGRIC., PROFILING FOOD CONSUMPTION IN AMERICA (2002), 
available at www.usda.gov/factbook/chapter2.pdf. 
 23 See, e.g., Amanda Spake & Mary Brophy Marcus, Overeating and Lack of Exercise 
Cause Obesity, OBESITY: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 65-72 (Andrea C. Nakaya, ed., 2006); Ellen 
Ruppel Shell, The Government Should Take Action to Help Reduce Obesity, OBESITY: 
OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 154-57 (Andrea C. Nakaya, ed., 2006); What Causes Overweight and 
Obesity?, U.S. DEP‟T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., (2010), available at 
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/dci/Diseases/obe/obe_causes.html. 
 24 See, e.g., Spake & Marcus, supra note 23, at 65-72; Shell, supra note 23, at 154-57. 
 25 Profiling Food Consumption in America, U.S. DEP‟T OF AGRIC. (2002), 
www.usda.gov/factbook/chapter2.pdf. 
 26 See, e.g., id. Some additional causes of decline in levels of physical activity include 
advances in labor-saving technologies, the growing popularity of television, computers, and 
video games, and the marked decline of physical education in schools. KELLY BROWNELL, 
FOOD FIGHT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE FOOD INDUSTRY, AMERICA‟S OBESITY CRISIS & WHAT 
WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 74-79 (2004). 
 27 See, e.g., U.S. DEP‟T OF AGRIC., supra note 25.  
 28 Id.   
 29 Id. 
 30 See, e.g., Spake & Marcus, supra note 23. 
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provide them with adequate nutrition and a reasonable caloric intake; almost 
assuredly, they will not.31 On the contrary, if a modern American desires a healthy 
lifestyle, she must make a conscious, determined, and sustained effort to do so.   
It is because relatively few Americans take such difficult steps, preferring instead 
the default (and much easier) societal path, that obesity has become such a problem. 
In sum, the explosion of obesity rates in recent decades has been caused by a 
dramatic shift in America‟s background food and exercise environment in an 
aggressively obesogenic direction.32    
III.  WHAT CAN BE DONE TO ADDRESS THE OBESITY CRISIS 
A.  The Government, Not the Individual, Is the Best Place to Address the Problem 
As discussed above, the current obesity epidemic has been primarily caused by a 
dramatic change in the background gastronomical and exercise context; thus, 
heightened obesity levels can be blamed on the current “toxic” background 
environment.33 As a result, nothing short of a significant environmental shift in a 
healthy direction is likely to curb, and/or reduce the incidence of obesity.  
The government is very likely the only agent capable of effectuating the 
significant environmental changes required to successfully combat obesity. 
Individuals are unlikely to conquer obesity on their own, at least on the wide scale 
needed to substantially reduce obesity rates nationwide. Indeed, the obesity problem 
exists today precisely because large numbers of Americans have experienced 
considerable difficulty controlling their diets. There is no cogent reason to think that 
the situation will improve in the future without outside help.34   
Similarly, the private sector is unlikely to be effective in combating obesity, at 
least without government prodding. To understand why, it is first important to 
realize that many private businesses, such as fast-food, snack, and soft-drink 
companies, are a large part of the obesity problem.35 The numerous private 
                                                          
 31 See, e.g., U.S. DEP‟T OF AGRIC., supra note 25. 
 32 An alternative explanation of the causes of the obesity epidemic argues that rising rates 
have been primarily caused by a societal-wide decrease in personal responsibility over the past 
few decades. This claim, that millions of Americans have somehow lost their powers of 
appetitive self-control in recent years, is quite suspect as it appears both intuitively 
implausible, and, more importantly, has been contradicted by the empirical literature. See, 
e.g., Kelly D. Brownell et. al., Personal Responsibility And Obesity: A Constructive Approach 
to a Controversial Issue, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 378, 379-80 (2010), available at 
http://www.yaleruddcenter.org/resources/upload/docs/what/policy/PersonalResponsibility_H
A_3.10.pdf (explaining that trends in both adolescent and adult behavior indicative of 
personal responsibility have both shown “stable or improving patterns of personal 
responsibility” in recent years despite the concomitant explosion of obesity rates among both 
groups; hence, rising rates of obesity cannot be plausibly thought to be due to a general 
decrease in personal responsibility). 
 33 See, e.g., U.S. DEP‟T OF AGRIC., supra note 25. 
 34 After all, individuals by themselves can do little to change the current unhealthy 
background context against which food and exercise decisions are made. 
 35 See, e.g., Menu Labeling in Chain Restaurants: Opportunities for Public Policy, RUDD 
CTR. FOR FOOD POLICY & OBESITY (2008), http://www.yaleruddcenter.org/resources/upload/ 
docs/what/reports/RuddMenuLabelingReport20 08.pdf. 
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companies that turn profits by selling unhealthy food products have every incentive 
to maintain the status quo.36 Unless pressured by the government or the public, it is 
fanciful to expect action from such businesses. 
But what about diet companies, whose business is to successfully reduce obesity? 
While many such companies exist,37 there are several reasons to think that they will 
fail to significantly stem the obesity epidemic. First, despite being a multi-billion 
dollar industry that has been around for years, obesity rates remain at epidemic 
levels.38 Second, not every obese American chooses to attempt to diet.39 Third, 
because diet remedies are voluntary, “they are only successful with individuals who 
are very close to being able to exercise effective self-control.”40 Thus, it is 
reasonable to assume that dieting will not be an effective anti-obesity strategy for a 
large segment of the population.   
In addition, diets are, at best, only temporary solutions that do nothing to alter the 
underlying obesogenic eating environment. Even if a person successfully loses 
weight through dieting, upon reaching the diet goal, that person must then reenter the 
same obesogenic environment that most likely caused the problem in the first place. 
Back in such an environment, he or she is very likely to revert back to pre-diet 
unhealthy habits. This most likely explains why only 5% of Americans who lose 
weight through dieting keep it off in the long run.41 In short, the diet industry 
functions as a societal “band aid,” which treats the symptoms of American obesity, 
but does nothing to address its underlying causes. 
In sum, if the war on obesity is to be successful, government involvement is 
necessary because the government seems to be the only agent capable of nudging or 
pushing the obesogenic environment in a significantly more healthful direction.  
B.  Potentially Effective Anti-Obesity Policies 
If strong government action is warranted in an effort to contain the obesity 
“outbreak,” there are several potentially effective policies that could be 
implemented. These policies include: (i) “full disclosure laws” requiring the 
increased dissemination of nutritional information, such as the conspicuous posting 
                                                          
 36 See, e.g., id.   
 37 The weight loss business is a multi-billion dollar industry. It is estimated that Americans 
spend between $33 billion and $55 billion annually on weight loss products and services 
including medical procedures and pharmaceuticals. Harvey Jones, Profiting from America’s 
Portly Population, REUTERS (Apr. 21, 2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUS107630+21-
Apr-2008+PRN20080421. 
 38 The cynic might also point out that it is not in the economic interests of diet companies 
to permanently cure their patients as doing so will deprive themselves of repeat customers. 
 39 A 1997 Conference Report estimated that, at that time, approximately 25% of men and 
40% of women were actively attempting to lose weight. The report lamented the extreme 
dearth of reliable statistics with respect to the diet industry. Commercial Weight Loss Products 
and Programs, FED TRADE COMM‟N (1997), http://www.ft c.gov/os/1998/03/weightlo. 
rpt.htm#A. 
 40 Joseph Heath, The Benefits of Cooperation, 34 PHIL. & AND PUB. AFF. 313, 343 (2006).   
 41 The Facts about Weight Loss Products and Programs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN 
(1993), http://www.thefree library.com/The+facts+about+weight+loss+products+and+pro 
grams.-a014401286. 
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of caloric and nutritional content at fast food and chain restaurants;42 (ii) restrictions 
on the advertising of certain low-nutritional foods, such as fast-food, snack, and soda 
products;43 (iii) requiring unhealthy food purveyors to post conspicuous warnings 
concerning the dangers of consuming their products;44 (iv) providing subsidies to 
growers and manufacturers of healthy foods;45 (v) imposing a “fat tax” on foods 
containing an especially low nutritional content;46 (vi) banning certain foods, and/or 
ingredients; and (vii) enacting special food policies for particular sub-groups, such as 
children and those living in poor and disadvantaged neighborhoods.47     
C.  There Is a Strong Prima Facie Case for Government Intervention 
Based on the magnitude of the American obesity epidemic, ceteris paribus,48 
strong government action is urgently needed to combat the crisis. When the 
American population has been threatened with other crises responsible for killing 
thousands of citizens—such as cancer, contagious diseases, war, and terrorism—the 
government has responded strongly to defend and preserve the lives of Americans. 
So why has the government done comparatively little to combat obesity—the “silent 
killer” responsible for more than 160,000 preventable deaths per year?49    
                                                          
 42 See, e.g., RUDD CTR. FOR FOOD POLICY & OBESITY, supra note 35 (providing a general 
explication of the rationale and effectiveness of such policies); Christina A. Roberto et al., 
Rationale and Evidence for Menu-Labeling Legislation, 37 AM. J. PREV. MED., 546-51 (2009) 
(same).  
 43 See, e.g., Jennifer L. Harris, Television Viewing and Unhealthy Diet: Implications for 
Children and Media Interventions, 24 HEALTH COMM. 660-673 (2009) (discussing the 
(unhealthy) food advertising industry and the effects of food advertising on unhealthy 
consumption patterns); Trends in Television Food Advertising: Progress in Reducing 
Unhealthy Marketing to Young People?, YALE RUDD CTR. FOR FOOD POLICY & OBESITY 
(2010), http://www.yaleruddcenter.org/resources/upload/docs/what/reports/RuddReport_TV 
FoodAdvertising_2.10.pdf (same); Jennifer L. Harris et al., Priming Effects of Television Food 
Advertising on Eating Behavior, 28 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 404-13 (2009) (same). 
 44 See, e.g., Roberto, supra note 42.   
 45 See, e.g., id.   
 46 For a discussion of the effectiveness of these policies, see, e.g., Brownell, supra note 5; 
YALE CTR. FOR FOOD POLICY & OBESITY (2009), supra note 5. 
 47 It is well-known that persons in minority and disadvantaged neighborhoods have limited 
access to healthy foods. See, e.g., Access to Healthy Foods in Low-Income Neighborhoods: 
Opportunities for Public Policy, YALE CTR. FOR FOOD POLICY & OBESITY (2008), 
http://www.yaleruddcenter.org/resources/upload/docs/what/reports/RuddReportAccesstoHealt
hyFoods2008.pdf. The above list of possible policy responses is not exhaustive. Nor should 
the inclusion of any policy be taken to mean that such policy is necessarily supported by the 
author. Rather, the purpose of the above adumbration of policies is merely to provide an 
illustrative list of the types of polices that have been considered as possible candidates in the 
fight against obesity.   
 48 Ceteris Paribus  is a Latin phrase that roughly translates as all other things being equal.  
 49 NAT‟L INST. OF HEALTH, supra note 2. 
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The answer appears to be that obesity is thought to be a matter of personal 
responsibility and therefore none of the government‟s business.50 Unlike contagious 
diseases and terrorism, obesity is a harm that the individual is thought to bring upon 
himself; thus, it is believed that individuals must bear its costs in accordance with 
the common law maxim volenti non fit injuria.51 Intervening in the food industry to 
address the obesity problem would, according to this objection, constitute unjustified 
government paternalism.52 Consequently, it is thought that the costs of obesity must 
be borne by the individual for the greater good of individual freedom.53  
IV.  THE PATERNALISM OBJECTION TO GOVERNMENT ANTI-OBESITY LEGISLATION 
This Article now considers the question of whether government anti-obesity 
legislation can overcome the paternalism objection. This objection must be 
addressed, for, even assuming that government intervention is the most effective 
method of combating obesity, it does not follow that it is legitimate—that the 
government has the right to intervene. A worthwhile end does not justify all means. 
This section begins by outlining the basic anti-paternalist objection against 
government intervention in the food industry, moving on to discuss possible 
responses to the objection. Ultimately, this Article concludes that the paternalism 
objection fails to put government anti-obesity regulation off-limits. Raised against 
some anti-obesity policies which, in reality, have a non-paternalistic basis, it is 
entirely beside the point. Put forth as an objection to policies supported by a soft or 
weak paternalism rationale (which sanctions government interference only to the 
extent necessary to ensure the voluntariness of choices), it fails. The objection 
generally succeeds, however, in prohibiting more intrusive measures supported only 
by a hard paternalism rationale (which endorses overriding voluntary choices for 
one‟s own good). Thus, while the paternalism objection cannot be said to prohibit 
anti-obesity legislation, it can be said to establish limits to such regulation.   
A.  The Basic Anti-Paternalism Argument Against Government  
Intervention in the Food Industry 
In its most basic form, the anti-paternalism argument against government 
intervention in the food industry states that: (i) government anti-obesity policies are 
                                                          
 50 See, e.g., Boaz, supra note 6; Radley Balko, Government Gets Fat Fighting Obesity 
(2004), http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=4532; Jacob Sullum, The War on Fat: 
Is the Size of Your Butt the Government's Business?, REASON MAGAZINE (Aug./Sept. 2004); 
DAVID HARSANYI, NANNY STATE: HOW FOOD FASCISTS, TEETOTALING DO-GOODERS, PRIGGISH 
MORALISTS, AND OTHER BONEHEADED BUREAUCRATS ARE TURNING AMERICA INTO A NATION 
OF CHILDREN (2007); JAMES T. BENNETT & THOMAS J. DILORENZO, THE FOOD & DRINK 
POLICE: AMERICA‟S NANNIES, BUSYBODIES & PETTY TYRANTS (1999); Mario  J. Rizzo & 
Douglas Glen Whitman, Little Brother is Watching You: New Paternalism on the Slippery 
Slopes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 685-739 (2009). 
 51 See, e.g., id. Volenti non fit injuria is a Latin phrase that roughly translates as “to a 
willing person, no injury is done.”  
 52 See, e.g., Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 50. 
 53 See, e.g., id. 
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paternalistic; (ii) paternalism is (always) wrong; and (iii) therefore, such legislation 
is unjustified.54  
To understand the first premise, which states that government anti-obesity 
policies are paternalistic, it is necessary to first define the term “paternalism.” While 
paternalism has been defined in a variety of different ways, the basic concept is clear 
enough;  specifically, in the rather typical case in which we have two agents, X and 
Y, we can say that X acts paternalistically towards Y if, and only if, X: (i) performs 
(or refrains from performing) some action Z that interferes with the liberty of Y; (ii) 
for the explicit purpose of advancing the interests of Y; (iii) without obtaining the 
consent of Y.55 Thus, government anti-obesity polices can be thought to be 
paternalistic if they (i) curtail the gastronomical (or other) liberty of Americans; (ii) 
with the goal of “forcing” upon them a healthy lifestyle; (iii) without their consent. 
The second premise of the anti-paternalism argument states that paternalism is 
wrong. The supposed wrongness of paternalism is typically based upon one of two 
standard arguments: (1) the consequentialist anti-paternalism argument;56 and (2) the 
“autonomy-based” anti-paternalism argument.57 Because it is necessary to have at 
least a basic understanding of these two classic arguments to fully comprehend the 
force of the anti-paternalism objection, each of them is discussed in some detail 
below.    
The first and most straightforward anti-paternalism argument is consequentialist 
in nature. In short, the argument is that an individual is both a better judge and 
securer of his own well-being than is an external agent.58 Thus, for the sake of his 
own good, an individual should have free rein to follow his own path in life.59 
Provided that his conduct is purely self-regarding and does not harm others, an 
external agent should not interfere with his affairs.60 
There are two primary reasons why an individual is thought to be a better judge 
and securer of his own good than an external agent. First, an individual has an 
extremely strong motive or incentive to be concerned with his own good, as what 
happens to him affects him personally and directly.61 While others may be motivated 
                                                          
 54 This is typically the complaint of those who argue that government "has no business in 
the food industry," even if it is not always explicitly stated in terms of paternalism.   
 55 See, e.g., Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (2005), 
http://mein ong.stanford.edu/entries/paternalism/; Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, MORALITY 
AND THE LAW 271, 271 (Joel Feinberg & Jules Coleman, eds., Wordsworth 2000).  
 56 See, e.g., John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, MORALITY AND THE LAW 259-70 (Joel Feinberg 
& Jules Coleman, eds., 2000) 
 57 See, e.g., id. 
 58 See, e.g., id.   
 59 See, e.g., id.   
 60 See, e.g., id.; William Glod, How Not to Argue Against Paternalism, REASON PAPERS 9 
(Fall 2008); Richard J. Arneson, Mill versus Paternalism, 90 ETHICS 470, 472-73 (1980).   
 61 See, e.g., Mill, supra note 56, at 262. Mill states: “He is the person most interested in his 
own well-being: the interest which any other person, except in cases of strong personal 
attachment, can have in it, is trifling, compared with that which he himself has; the interest 
which society has in him individually (except as to his conduct to others) is fractional, and 
altogether indirect.” Id. 
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by benevolence to promote his good, such a motive is generally of much weaker 
intensity.62 Second, due to his intimate knowledge of his own person and 
circumstances, an individual is thought to possess better information than does an 
external agent as to what will promote his good.63   
In sum, the consequentialist anti-paternalism argument states that an individual is 
much better suited than an external agent to promote his own good due to both his 
superior incentive and information with respect to that good.64 While government (or 
other) interference in an individual‟s life may be motivated by benevolence, it is 
thought to be bound to do more harm than good in terms of the individual‟s good 
that it purports to advance.65   
The second classic argument against paternalism contends that paternalism 
conflicts with autonomy.66 The basic idea is that a paternalistic act, by overriding the 
preferences of the individual, disrespects and overrules her autonomy—an 
individual‟s ability to make her own choices.67 This violation of autonomy 
disrespects the individual‟s standing as a rational, moral being, as an end in herself, 
depriving her of her dignity as a human being.68 It disrespects her individuality.    
Based largely upon these two arguments, which purport to show that paternalism 
is, in general, unwarranted, anti-obesity legislation critics conclude that anti-obesity 
legislation is unjustified.69 They argue that legislation that curtails the liberty of 
Americans to eat whatever they choose is objectionable for exactly the same sorts of 
reasons showing paternalism to be generally unattractive.70 The fact that anti-obesity 
                                                          
 62 Mill, supra note 56, at 262. We might imagine an immediate family member such as a 
spouse having an incentive of similar strength as the individual; however, it is still likely to be 
less. Moreover, the incentive will become increasingly diminished the further abstracted an 
individual or agent becomes from the particular individual. 
 63 Id. Mill states: “[W]ith respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most ordinary 
man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed 
by anyone else. The interference of society to overrule his judgment and purposes in what 
only regards himself, must be grounded on general presumptions; which may be altogether 
wrong, and even if right, are as likely as not to be misapplied to individual cases, by persons 
no better acquainted with the circumstances of such cases than those are who look at them 
merely from without.”; see also Glod, supra note 60, at 9.   
 64 Mill, supra note 56, at 262.   
 65 See, e.g., Mill, supra note 56, at 262; Glod, supra note 60, at 9-13; Arneson, supra note 
60, at 472-73. 
 66 See, e.g., Arneson, supra note 60, at 475-77; Glod, supra note 60, at 13-17; Douglas N. 
Husak, Paternalism and Autonomy, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 27, 27-46 (1981); KLEINIG, supra 
note 8, at 18-37. 
 67 See, e.g., Arneson, supra note 60, at 475-77; Glod, supra note 60, at 13-17; Husak, 
supra note 60, at 27-46; KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 27-37. 
 68 See, e.g., Arneson, supra, note 60, at 475-77; Glod, supra note 60, at 13-17; Husak, 
supra note 60, at 27-46; KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 18-38. 
 69 See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1, 1245-77 (2005); Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 50, at 686-87, 700, 711-39; Boaz, 
supra note 50; Balko, supra note 50; Sullum, supra note 50.  
 70 See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 69.   
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policies are benevolently motivated by a desire to improve the good of Americans 
does nothing, they argue, to make anti-obesity legislation more palatable.71   
Appealing to the general consequentialist anti-paternalism argument, critics 
typically claim that the incentive that the government has to promote the health of a 
particular average American individual is considerably weaker than the incentive 
that an individual has to promote his own health.72 Moreover, they claim that an 
individual is a better judge than the government as to whether the pleasure he derives 
from eating particular foods (for example, a diet of daily cheeseburgers) will, on 
balance, make him better off.73 Following the logic of the general consequentialist 
anti-paternalist objection, the anti-paternalism critic argues that, due to superior 
incentive and knowledge, the individual is better placed than the government to 
make decisions regarding his own health and eating habits.74   
Critics of government intervention also appeal to the autonomy-based general 
anti-paternalism objection, arguing that such “government knows best” legislation 
overrides the voluntary gastronomical choices of individuals, constituting a deep 
affront to the dignity and rightful independence of individuals with respect to their 
eating choices.75 One convinced that this autonomy-based anti-paternalism argument 
shows the wrongness of government anti-obesity legislation might utter the phrase, 
“who does the government think they are, telling me what to eat?” to succinctly sum 
up their general sentiment.   
In sum, opponents of anti-obesity legislation typically base their opposition to 
such policies on the belief that such intervention would constitute government 
paternalism. Since paternalism is thought to be wrong, anti-obesity policies are 
deemed to be unjustified.76  
It is important to note, however, that merely assuming that paternalism is, in 
general, objectionable (as most do) is not enough to conclude that the types of anti-
obesity policies that we have been considering  are unjustified, even assuming all of 
them to be paternalistic. This is because, unless one holds that there is a conclusive 
objection against all paternalistic legislation, prima facie unwarranted paternalistic 
legislation may sometimes be overridden by countervailing considerations.   
In the topic under consideration, the justifiability of anti-obesity policies, there 
are such countervailing considerations.  Specifically, there are strong arguments in 
favor of government intervention, to wit, the need to address the high societal costs 
of obesity and overweight previously discussed.77 Thus, even assuming that anti-
                                                          
 71 See, e.g., Boaz, supra note 50; Balko, supra note 50; Sullum, supra note 50; Rizzo & 
Whitman, supra note 50; Mitchell, supra note 69, at 31-35. 
 72 See, e.g., Boaz, supra note 50; Balko, supra note 50; Sullum, supra note 50; BENNETT & 
DILORENZO, supra note 50; Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 50; Mitchell, supra note 69, at 31-
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 73 See, e.g., Boaz, supra note 50; Balko, supra note 50; Sullum, supra note 50; Rizzo & 
Whitman, supra note 50; Mitchell, supra note 69, at 31-35. 
 74 See, e.g., Balko, supra note 50; Sullum, supra note 50; BENNETT & DILORENZO, supra 
note 50; Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 50; Mitchell, supra note 69, at 31-35. 
 75 See, e.g., Balko, supra note 50; Sullum, supra note 50; BENNETT & DILORENZO, supra 
note 50; Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 50; Mitchell, supra note 69, at 31-35. 
 76 See, e.g., Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 50. 
 77 See, e.g., Hammond & Levine, supra note 4. 
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obesity policies are paternalistic, such policies cannot be dismissed by the casual 
remark that paternalism is in general undesirable.   
On the contrary, the anti-intervention activist has a substantially heavier burden 
to fulfill. If they object to intervention on consequentialist grounds, they must either: 
(1) show specifically why each and every type of proposed legislation would make 
individuals worse off (instead of relying on a general anti-paternalist objection); or 
(2) devise an argument that shows that there is a more general consequentialist 
reason for abstaining altogether from health-promoting paternalistic legislation, 
notwithstanding the fact that a particular piece of paternalistic legislation might 
make an individual better off. 
If their objection is non-consequentialist in nature, (i.e., based upon the claim 
that paternalism conflicts with autonomy), they must show either why such an 
objection mandates the  proscription of paternalistic legislation in all cases, or why 
anti-obesity policies do not come within any legitimate exceptions to the general 
paternalism prohibition. 
B.  Some Legislation Can Be Justified Entirely on Non-Paternalistic Grounds 
Recall that, for a government policy to be accurately classified as paternalistic it 
must: (i) curtail the liberty of individuals; (ii) without their consent; (iii) for the 
purpose of advancing their own good.78 As (i), (ii), and (iii) are all necessary 
conditions of paternalism, a policy will not be properly considered paternalistic if 
any of these three prongs are absent.79 Several policies that have been considered 
lack one or more of these conditions; thus, they can be justified entirely on non-
paternalistic grounds. 
The first necessary condition of a paternalistic law is that it “curtails the liberty 
of individuals.”80 Some of the policies that have been considered do not satisfy this 
condition; specifically, those that would merely educate or inform consumers. 
Consider, for example, “full disclosure laws” that would require the conspicuous 
posting of nutritional information at fast-food and chain restaurants, or compelled 
speech legislation that would require unhealthy food advertisers to warn consumers 
of the health risks of their products. Such legislation, with the sole goal of informing 
and educating consumers, would not interfere with individual liberty. Rather, it 
would promote the exercise of individual liberty by facilitating informed decision-
making.   
Notably, under such laws persons would remain free to eat whatever they chose; 
these laws would not restrict their gastronomical liberty. One might argue that such 
legislation would prevent an individual from enjoying his artery-clogging meal in 
blissful ignorance, but this does not seem to be a freedom worth protecting; 
moreover, it is not the type of liberty that Mill and other traditional opponents of 
paternalism had in mind. Indeed, even John Stuart Mill himself, a staunch anti-
paternalist, did not oppose reasoning, remonstrating, persuading, or entreating an 
individual to choose a course of action thought to be in furtherance of his own 
good.81   
                                                          
 78 See Dworkin, supra note 55.   
 79 See, e.g., id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Mill, supra note 56, at 259.  
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The second necessary condition for genuinely paternalistic legislation requires 
that it be implemented without the consent of its target individuals.82 Because some 
anti-obesity legislation can be reasonably presumed to be welcomed by most 
persons, it is not the case that all anti-obesity policies are accurately characterized as 
lacking consent. Legislation that is consented to is not paternalistic, and hence, can 
be justified entirely on non-paternalistic grounds. 
Consider the education-focused legislation just discussed.83 Because all rational 
consumers can be safely assumed to be interested in knowing material health 
information with respect to  the products that they consume, there is a good reason to 
presume that such policies have the consent of the people; at any rate, it would be 
odd for persons to have a considered position against such policies. Importantly, if 
the public can be presumed to consent to these education-focused policies, then they 
are not paternalistic.84   
Additional policies can similarly be thought to have the consent of the 
individuals whose good they aim to promote. Consider, for example, policies to 
increase the availability, affordability, and quality of healthy foods in minority and 
disadvantaged neighborhoods. In these areas, healthy food is typically relatively 
expensive, scarce, and of poor quality.85 The target individuals for such a policy 
would of course be the individuals living in those neighborhoods; the purpose of the 
program would be to improve their well-being.86 It seems fanciful to suggest that 
such a program would be forcing a good upon these individuals that they do not 
accept.  Instead, it is reasonable to presume that such a policy would be met with 
consent.87 After all, the program would simply expand their options. Even given the 
greater availability, affordability, and quality of healthy foods, individuals living in 
the neighborhood would still be free to choose not to consume healthier goods.   
Finally, consider the large class of individuals who desire to control their diets 
yet find that despite their best efforts, they are unable to do so. Many of these 
individuals would surely welcome government (or other) external help in their quest 
to live a healthy lifestyle. To the extent that such persons welcome or request 
external help, a government that provides it will not be acting paternalistically, for it 
will be acting with consent.   
                                                          
 82 See, e.g., id.  Dworkin, supra note 55. 
 83 See, e.g., RUDD CTR. FOR FOOD POLICY & OBESITY, supra note 35; Roberto et al., supra 
note 42.  
 84 Gerald Dworkin makes a similar point when he states: “[M]easures such as „truth-in-
advertising‟ acts and Pure Food and Drug legislation . . . are often attacked as paternalistic but 
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 85 YALE CTR. FOR FOOD POLICY & OBESITY, supra note 47. 
 86 Id.   
 87 This is especially true if, which would most likely be the case, that they would not pay 
any additional taxes for such goods. While other taxpayers would of course be charged with 
bearing the costs of these subsidies, this would not render such legislation paternalistic for the 
purpose of the legislation would not be to interfere with the liberty of these taxpayers for their 
own good.  
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There is good reason for thinking that there are a substantial number of people in 
this situation. Considering that health and the absence of obesity are goods desired 
by virtually everyone and that numerous people experience considerable difficulty 
controlling their current diet, it is by no means a stretch to suppose that many would 
welcome external aid that enables them to better achieve their goals.   
The third requirement of genuinely paternalistic legislation is that it be motivated 
or justified by a desire to improve the good of its target individuals.88 While a desire 
to improve the health of Americans certainly provides much of the impetus behind 
anti-obesity legislation, not all such policies can be supported only by an appeal to 
benevolence. On the contrary, some anti-obesity legislation can be justified by the 
uncontroversial Millian harm principle, which contends that government action is 
justified to prevent and/or redress harm to others.89   
For example, consider a proposal to institute a “fat tax” on unhealthy fast-food, 
snacks, and soda. While a proponent might justify such a proposal based upon a 
desire to improve the health of Americans, it could also be supported by a desire to 
recoup the staggering health care costs currently associated with obesity.90 As 
previously discussed, obesity adds $86-147 billion per year in increased health care 
costs, and about half of these costs are picked up by the American taxpayer.91 A “fat 
tax” could therefore be justified without reference to any kind of paternalistic 
argument. Obese and overweight Americans would simply be asked to pay for the 
harm which they inflict upon society in the form of higher health care costs. Thus, 
the “fat tax” would actually promote personal responsibility.   
In addition, relying on Mill‟s harm principle, one could put forth an argument to 
end the current subsidies of unhealthy food products, such as the billions of dollars 
in annual subsidies to grain farmers “whose crops feed animals for meat, milk, and 
eggs and become cheap ingredients in processed food.”92 The idea would be that 
such subsidies artificially distort food preferences in an unhealthy direction, leading 
individuals to consume greater quantities of unhealthy food than they otherwise 
would, causing them consequent harm.93 A policy ending such subsidies would not 
have to answer the paternalism objection. 
In sum, several anti-obesity policies that are often characterized as paternalistic 
are, in fact, nothing of the sort. An advocate of those policies need not engage the 
paternalism objection at all. Of course, because certain policies are not paternalistic, 
it does not follow that they are thereby justified. Nonetheless, because obesity and 
overweight are jointly responsible for staggering social costs, there are powerful 
reasons of a straightforwardly consequentialist sort arguing in favor of the 
implementation of aggressive anti-obesity legislation. For those policies that do not 
have to deal with the paternalism objection, their overall justification should not be 
hard to demonstrate. One would simply need to show that they promise to be 
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effective in fighting obesity and that any negative side-effects fail to outweigh the 
promised gains.  
C.  Can Anti-Obesity Legislation Be Justified on Paternalistic Grounds? 
1.  The Case for Paternalistic Anti-Obesity Legislation Depends Crucially on the 
Extent to Which the Food Choices of Americans Are Voluntary 
Assuming that at least some types of anti-obesity legislation cannot be supported 
on non-paternalistic grounds,94 can we turn to paternalism for help? Is it possible to 
justify interfering with the food choices of Americans for paternalistic reasons?   
The answer, in large part, depends upon the voluntariness of American‟s 
unhealthy food choices. If such choices are fully voluntary, then Americans can be 
said to have voluntarily accepted the risks concomitant to an unhealthy diet. 
Moreover, we may be happy to have them bear the costs of those risks that they have 
accepted with eyes wide open, with informed consent. If, however, their unhealthy 
food choices are less than fully voluntary, there may be reason for the government to 
intervene. 
i.  Whether an External Agent Should Respect the Choice of an Adult Depends 
Importantly on the Extent to Which That Choice Is Voluntary 
There is good reason for the government to defer to the voluntary self-regarding 
choices of competent adults.95 By contrast, those choices made on the basis of 
inadequate information, coercion, material misunderstanding, or some other 
significant volitional or cognitive defect, merit considerably less respect.96 In support 
of this claim, consider that the two standard arguments against paternalism97 apply, if 
at all, with considerably diminished force against prospective paternalist interference 
with this impaired class of choices.98 
First, recall the consequentialist anti-paternalism argument previously discussed 
which claims that, due to superior incentive and information with respect to her own 
                                                          
 94 For example, fat taxes and product bans.  It is worth pointing out that even if taxing 
particular products is supported by a non-paternalistic rationale (such as Mill's harm 
principle), the non-paternalistic ground may support only relatively low levels of taxation. We 
may need to turn to paternalism to justify more robust levels of taxation aimed at curbing 
consumption rather than merely recouping societal costs. 
 95 The primary arguments in favor of doing so mirror the two standard anti-paternalism 
arguments previously discussed. First, there is the consequentialist argument that, due to 
superior incentive and information concerning her own good, an individual will better 
promote that good than will an external agent. Second, there exists the autonomy-based 
argument that states that one has the right to find one's own mode in life, and hence to have 
one's voluntary choices respected.   
 96 See, e.g., Thaddeus Mason Pope, Is Public Health Paternalism Really Never Justified? 
A Response to Joel Feinberg, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 121, 122-23 (2005); JOEL FEINBERG, 
HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 12-16, 98-99 (1986). 
 97 Specifically, the consequentialist anti-paternalism argument and the anti-paternalism 
argument that claims that paternalism conflicts with autonomy. 
 98 It is important to note, however, that an interference with even an impaired class of 
choices would still be paternalistic as long as the intervention: (i) curtailed an individual's 
liberty, (ii) without her consent; (iii) for the purpose of advancing her own good.  
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good, an individual will better promote that good than will an external agent.99 While 
this argument may have force with respect to her substantially voluntary choices, it 
is not at all clear that an individual‟s substantially non-voluntary “choices” will tend 
to promote her own good better than some path chosen for her by an external agent. 
This is because, ex hypothesi,100 an individual‟s substantially non-voluntary choices 
are defective in one of two primary ways.101 They are either: (1) tainted by a 
significant cognitive or volitional impairment;102 or (2) made on the basis of 
seriously limited or inaccurate information.103 This being the case, there is no longer 
any reason to put an extraordinary amount of faith in the individual‟s supposed 
superior decision-making ability with respect to her own good.104 Thus, it may often 
be the case that an external agent will better promote an individual‟s own good than 
will that individual‟s own substantially non-voluntary choices.105   
Second, consider the argument against paternalism which states that paternalism 
is wrong because it conflicts with autonomy.106 This standard anti-paternalism 
argument may prove to be an important shield against attempts to interfere with an 
individual‟s substantially voluntary self-regarding choices; however, it is at best of 
limited significance when utilized as protection against interference with one‟s 
                                                          
 99 See, e.g., Mill, supra note 56, at 262.   
 100 Ex hypothesi means according to the proposed hypothesis.  
 101 See, e.g., Pope, supra note 96, at 122-23; FEINBERG, supra note 96, at 12-16, 98-99. 
 102 For example, made while intoxicated, under severe mental distress or disease, under 
coercion, the pressures of addiction, etc. 
 103 See, e.g., Pope, supra note 96, at 122-23; FEINBERG, supra note 96, at 12-16, 98-99.   
 104 See, e.g., Pope, supra note 96, at 122-23; FEINBERG, supra note 96, at 12-16, 98-99.   
 105 For an illustrative example, consider the case of a cancer patient who values life and 
wants to be cured of his disease. Suppose he speaks to his doctor and demands to be 
prescribed cyanide as he believes that it will instantly cure him and do him no harm (perhaps 
he claims that he had a purported “vision” telling him so, or maybe a popular media figure 
endorsed such a cure). Here, the patient‟s “choice” to take the fatal drug is premised on 
obviously incorrect information and for that reason his choice can be said to be both deficient 
and less than voluntary. Should the doctor nevertheless heed the patient‟s request and 
administer the fatal dose in order to give effect to the patient's instructions? (Ignoring for now 
any professional, ethical, and/or legal duties that would of course militate against her doing 
so). On consequentialist grounds, the answer appears to be clearly no. Here, the doctor who 
paternalistically disregards her patient's expressed wishes, and instead prescribes 
chemotherapy, say, will almost assuredly make her patient better off, and by his own 
standards! After all, we have been assuming that the patient does not wish to die, and that his 
request for the fatal drug would not have been made but for his false information. In such a 
case any assumption that the individual has superior information with respect to his own good 
is plainly false. Indeed, the opposite is true, for it is the doctor who is in possession of the 
superior information with respect to the individual‟s own good. In such circumstances, the 
consequentialist calculus must argue in favor of paternalistic intervention. A similar analysis 
would follow if the deficiency making the patient‟s choice significantly less than voluntary 
were not a lack of accurate information but a cognitive or volitional defect. Imagine, for 
example, that the patient asked to be prescribed with cyanide while intoxicated.   
 106 See, e.g., Arneson, supra note 60.   
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primarily non-voluntary choices.107 Why this is so flows from the very meaning of 
autonomy.    
While autonomy is variously defined, the basic idea is clear enough; specifically, 
an agent possesses autonomy to the extent that she is capable of governing herself 
through the exercise of voluntary choices.108 This being so, substantially non-
voluntary choices contribute little to the exercise of autonomy, while fully non-
voluntary “choices” add nothing at all.109 Since non-voluntary choices are not 
autonomous, an individual‟s autonomy is not usurped by the overriding of such 
choices.110 Thus, the paternalist who seeks only to interfere with an individual‟s 
choices to the extent that they are non-voluntary does not usurp her autonomy as one 
cannot take from another what she does not have.111 On the contrary, by seeking to 
increase the incidence and the degree of autonomy-conferring voluntary individual 
choices, the paternalist who seeks merely to mitigate the ruinous consequences of 
one‟s non-voluntary choices should be seen as a promoter and friend of autonomy, if 
anything.112   
In sum, the two standard anti-paternalist arguments apply with greatly 
diminished force against the paternalist who only seeks to interfere with an 
individual‟s choices to the extent that such choices are non-voluntary. In general, the 
more voluntary an adult‟s choices are, the heavier the burden becomes for 
intervention and vice versa. 
ii.  Are the Food Choices of Americans Wholly Voluntary? 
Many assume that the unhealthy food choices of Americans are wholly 
voluntary.113 As a result, the current obesity crisis is often characterized as simply 
the result of an aggregate of poor personal, fully autonomous, choices.114 There is 
good reason to question this assumption.   
Before examining the extent to which the unhealthy food choices of Americans 
are voluntary, it is necessary to at least adumbrate the concept of a voluntary choice. 
While we often tend to think of a “voluntary choice” as a threshold concept, 
conceiving of any particular choice as either voluntary or non-voluntary, this way of 
thinking is somewhat inaccurate; in truth, there is a continuum of voluntariness.115 
On one end of the spectrum, there is the perfectly voluntary choice, one made with 
full information, completely functioning cognitive abilities, and made in a sober state 
                                                          
 107 See, e.g., Pope, supra note 96, at 122-23; FEINBERG, supra note 96, at 12-16, 98-99. 
 108 For a discussion of some of the various ways autonomy has been understood, see 
Husak, supra note 66, at 35-40; FEINBERG, supra note 96, at 27-52. 
 109 See, e.g., Pope, supra note 96, at 122-23; FEINBERG, supra note 96, at 12-16. 
 110 See, e.g., Pope, supra note 96, at 122-23; FEINBERG, supra note 96, at 12-16. 
 111 See, e.g., Pope, supra note 96, at 122-23; FEINBERG, supra note 96, at 12-16. 
 112 See, e.g., Pope, supra note 96, at 122-23; FEINBERG, supra note 96, at 12-16. 
 113 See, e.g.,  Boaz, supra note 6.   
 114 See, e.g., Balko, supra note 50; Sullum, supra note 50; BENNETT & DILORENZO, supra 
note 50; Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 50; Mitchell, supra note 69.  
 115 See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 96, at 113-17. 
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of mind in the absence of any sort of coercion, etc.116 Such a “perfectly voluntary 
choice” is an ideal that will “hardly ever be satisfied” fully in practice.117 At the other 
end of the spectrum, there is an entirely non-voluntary “choice,” one made with a 
complete lack of agential control.118 For example, a muscle spasm, an involuntary 
tick, or a seizure would constitute a perfectly non-voluntary “choice.”  
While the extremes on the continuum of voluntariness are clear, they are also (at 
least for present purposes) much less interesting than those choices that fall in 
between. For example, choices that are made under the influence of a volitional or 
cognitive defect,119 based upon limited or inaccurate information, or made with 
inadequate understanding.120 With all such choices on the continuum, the closer one 
lies to the “perfect voluntariness” pole, the more it is entitled to respect, and the 
heavier is the burden for the would-be interferer (and vice versa).121 
Turning to the question of the voluntariness of the unhealthy food choices of 
Americans, there are several reasons to think that such choices are less than fully 
voluntary. First, the voluntariness of unhealthy food choices is diminished by a lack 
of transparency regarding the nutritional content of particular foods, particularly 
those prepared at fast-food and other restaurant outlets.122 As the nutritional and 
caloric content of particular foods is far from obvious, there is good reason to believe 
that Americans often choose unhealthy food options without knowing their true 
nutritional value.123 Indeed, even purportedly “obvious” common sense judgments 
concerning what is healthy and what is not are often wrong.124 Thus, it is not always 
the case that ordering the salad instead of the hamburger and fries is the healthier 
choice.125 In fact, even nutritional experts have been found to consistently 
                                                          
 116 See, e.g., id. In brief, Feinberg states that one makes a perfectly voluntary choice if: “[i] 
the chooser is „competent‟ . . . [ii] he does not choose under coercion or duress . . . [iii] he 
does not choose because of more subtle manipulation . . . [iv] he does not choose because of 
ignorance or mistaken belief . . . [v] he does not choose in circumstances that are temporarily 
distorting.” Id. at 115. 
 117 Id. at 115-16. 
 118 See, e.g., id. at 114-15.  
 119 For example, while intoxicated, under heavy medication, under mental distress or 
disease, or simply emotionally upset. 
 120 See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 96, at 115. . 
 121 See id. 
 122 See, e.g., Menu Labeling in Chain Restaurants: Opportunities for Public Policy, RUDD 
CTR. FOR FOOD POLICY & OBESITY (2008), http://www.yaleruddcenter.org/resources/upload/ 
docs/what/reports/RuddMenuLabelingReport 2008.pdf; Christina A. Roberto et al., Rationale 
and Evidence for Menu-Labeling Legislation, 37 AM. J. PREV. MED. 546-51 (2009). 
 123 See, e.g., RUDD CTR. FOR FOOD POLICY & OBESITY, supra note 122; Roberto et al., 
supra note 122, at 546-51. 
 124 See, e.g., RUDD CTR. FOR FOOD POLICY & OBESITY, supra note 122; Roberto et al., 
supra note 122, at 546-51. 
 125 See, e.g., John H. Banzhaf III, Lawsuits Against Fast Food Restaurants Are an Effective 
Way to Combat Obesity, in OBESITY: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 126-32 (Andrea C. Nakaya ed., 
2006). Quoting a Wall Street Journal article, Banzhaf states: „HERE'S A FAST-FOOD 
nutrition quiz.  Which has the fewest calories: a McDonald‟s Quarter Pounder with Cheese, 
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underestimate the caloric content of unhealthy foods.126 To the extent that an 
individual chooses a food based in part on a mistaken belief as to its nutritional 
content, her choice is to that extent non-voluntary.  
A second factor that diminishes the voluntariness of food choices is misleading 
advertisements.127 Currently, the great majority of food ads promote unhealthy food 
products.128 Such advertisements do not contain any warnings about the harmful 
nature of the advertised food; rather, companies implicitly push the message that 
their unhealthy product is entirely compatible with a healthy lifestyle.129 They do this 
in a number of ways—for example, by employing Olympic and professional athletes 
as spokespeople for their products.130  Moreover, “[a]dvertising for food and 
beverages communicates potentially powerful food consumption cues, including 
images of attractive models eating, snacking at non-meal times, and positive 
emotions linked to food consumption.”131 Thus, advertising may, by way of 
subconscious cues and otherwise, push individuals to ingest unhealthy products that 
they would not otherwise consume. 
The unavailability of healthy foods in particular areas is a third factor that may 
diminish the voluntariness of unhealthy food choices, for many individuals might 
prefer to eat healthy diets, but refrain from doing so because they have little or no 
access to healthy foods.132 Lack of access to healthy food is particularly a problem in 
minority and impoverished neighborhoods, where, unsurprisingly, obesity rates tend 
to be highest.133 If healthy food is hard to come by, an individual, who of course 
must eat, has little choice but to consume whatever food is available. To the extent 
that an individual would prefer to live a healthy lifestyle, and only chooses to 
                                                          
Panera‟s Smoked Ham and Swiss sandwich, or Baja Fresh‟s grilled chicken salad?  
Surprisingly, it‟s a Quarter Pounder...the truth is that these and other wraps, salads and 
sandwiches being hyped as a healthy alternative to fast food are loaded with calories and 
fat...While the restaurant chains don‟t make any specific claims about the healthfulness or 
calorie content of their menu items, they nonetheless give consumers the impression that they 
are offering healthier food....But consumers are being fooled.”  Id. at 128. 
 126 See, e.g., RUDD CTR. FOR FOOD POLICY & OBESITY, supra note 122; Roberto et al., 
supra note 122, at 546-51. 
 127 For a general discussion of the (unhealthy) food advertising industry and the effects of 
food advertising on unhealthy consumption patterns, see, e.g., Jennifer L. Harris & John A. 
Bargh, Television Viewing and Unhealthy Diet: Implications for Children and Media 
Interventions, 24 HEALTH COMM. 660-73 (2009); Trends in Television Food Advertising: 
Progress in Reducing Unhealthy Marketing to Young People?, RUDD CTR. FOR FOOD POLICY 
& OBESITY (2010), http://www.yaleruddcenter.org/resources/upload/docs/what/reports/Rudd 
Report_TVFoodAdvertising_2.10.pdf; Jennifer L. Harris et al., Priming Effects of Television 
Food Advertising on Eating Behavior, 28 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 404-13 (2009). 
 128 See, e.g., RUDD CTR. FOR FOOD POLICY & OBESITY, supra note 35, at 5.   
 129 See, e.g., id.  
 130 See, e.g., id. 
 131 Jennifer L. Harris et al., supra note 127, at 405.   
 132 See, e.g., YALE CTR. FOR FOOD POLICY & OBESITY, supra note 47. 
 133 Id.   
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consume nutritionally poor foods because healthy options are not available, his 
unhealthy food choices are less than fully voluntary.   
The current subsidies of certain unhealthy foods are a fourth voluntariness-
reducing factor. Consider, for example, the billions of dollars annually spent on 
subsidies to grain farmers “whose crops feed animals for meat, milk and eggs and 
become cheap ingredients in processed food.”134 Such subsidization artificially 
lowers the prices of these foods, and thus, makes their healthy counterparts 
comparatively expensive. This artificially distorts food preferences towards these 
subsidized foods and reduces the voluntariness of their purchase and consumption.135 
The dramatic increase in standard portion sizes is a fifth factor that may function 
to decrease the voluntariness of current food consumption habits.136 Studies show 
that standard portion sizes have increased dramatically in the past few decades.137 
This fact, taken together with research showing that persons typically eat in “units” 
(in food outlets, the standard/default portion size), functions to reduce the 
voluntariness of overeating decisions. 138  
Imagine, for example, a regular patron of the local fast-food joint who frequently 
orders the standard hamburger and fries special, and has been doing so for years. His 
or her fast-food preferences may show perfect diachronic stability, and the individual 
may have consumed fast-food at equal intervals for years, say every Friday and 
Saturday night. This being so, he or she would have nonetheless consumed more and 
more calories from fast-food over the years, due simply to the steady increase in the 
default portion size.   
Consider that, in 1954, for example, a hamburger and fries meal at one of the 
standard fast-food chains might be expected to total 412 calories, whereas the 
standard burger and fries meal in 2004 would be expected to total 920 calories.139 
Simply consuming the updated default portion size would lead our fast-food patron 
to consume an excess 508 calories per meal, 1016 per week, over 52,000 per year, 
and over 260,000 over five years. This would lead to a weight-gain of over a pound a 
month, over 15 pounds per year, and over 75 pounds in five years.140 Our loyal fast-
                                                          
 134 Farm Subsidies Not in Sync with Food Pyramid, ASSOC. PRESS (Aug. 11, 2005), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/ id/8904252/ns/health-fitness/.  
 135 Farm Subsidies, supra note 92. 
 136 See, e.g., Barbara J. Rolls, Large Portion Sizes Play a Role in Rising Obesity Rates, in 
OBESITY: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 87-96 (Andrea C. Nakaya ed., 2006). 
 137 Id.  
 138 Studies have shown that an individual will typically consume whatever constitutes a 
standard or default serving of food, instead of eating a particular amount of food, regardless of 
the serving size given to him. In addition, in experiments where participants were randomly 
given different portion sizes, those who were given (and consumed) the larger portion size did 
not report being more sated than those who consumed smaller portions. Moreover, those given 
the larger portion sizes did not compensate for their relative overeating by consuming 
relatively less at their next meal. Id. at 93-95.   
 139 Id. at 91. 
 140 Given that one pound of fat contains approximately 3,500 calories. See, e.g., Vincent 
Iannelli, How Many Calories are in a Pound of Fat? (2006), http://pediatrics.about.com/od/ 
obesity/a/06_calpound_fat.htm (one pound of fat is equivalent to approximately 3,500 
calories). 
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food patron did not voluntarily change her eating habits year after year, 
progressively preferring larger portions. Nor did she carefully weigh the risks for and 
against consuming larger quantities of unhealthy food. Rather, she was merely 
“acted upon” by outside forces that changed the standard portion size without her 
consent. 
Our evolutionary history may be a sixth factor that reduces the voluntariness of 
our unhealthy food choices.141 There has been significant research that suggests 
evolutionary development has made us inclined to high-fat, high-salt, and high-sugar 
diets.142 Such a preference for many years provided humans with a useful 
evolutionary adaptation. When food was scarce, meals might be few and far 
between; moreover, one might expect to exert a considerable amount of energy to 
procure dinner.143 Hence, a high-fat, high-salt, high-sugar meal was once a prudent 
choice.144 In the modern world, however, where cheap fast food is both plentiful and 
ubiquitous, such a diet is no longer the sensible option. Nonetheless, our 
evolutionary instincts continue to push us to eat such unhealthy foods.145 Indeed, 
there has been significant work done to suggest that certain unhealthy foods are 
addictive in just the same ways as are tobacco and other drugs.146 If all of this is true, 
there may be reason to suggest that, in general, our preferences for unhealthy, high-
fat, high-sugar, and high-salt foods are less than fully voluntary.   
A seventh reason to question whether unhealthy food choices are fully voluntary 
flows from the fact that there is reason to question whether many Americans fully 
appreciate the risks and causes of overweight and obesity.147 There certainly exists, 
among the majority of the population, a generalized notion that such conditions are 
disabling. But there is a real question as to the extent to which persons are aware of 
the specific health risks associated with obesity and overweight, such as the 
significantly increased risk of stroke and type 2 diabetes, the serious symptoms 
associated with these specific conditions, and the causal relationships between eating 
particularly unhealthy foods and the likelihood of developing obesity and 
overweight. 
Moreover, there is certainly a difference between knowing that eating 
hamburgers and fries every day is bad for you and an emotional “gut” understanding 
that such a diet is not in the interests of one‟s long-term health and vitality.148 Thus, 
                                                          
 141 See, e.g., Michael D. Lemonick, Obesity Is a Result of Human Evolution, in OBESITY: 
OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 97-104 (Andrea C. Nakaya ed., 2006). 
 142 See, e.g., id. 
 143 See, e.g., id. 
 144 See, e.g., id. 
 145 See, e.g., id. 
 146 See, e.g., Ashley N. Gearhardt et al., Preliminary Validation of the Yale Food Addiction 
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The Ethics of Smoking, in SOCIAL AND PERSONAL ETHICS 244-55, at 247-48 (William H. Shaw 
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Americans may not fully appreciate the extent to which obesity and overweight are 
bad for their health. To the extent that one does not know the risks of obesity and 
overweight, and/or that unhealthy food causes these conditions, his decision to 
indulge in unhealthy food is less than fully voluntary. 
An eighth reason suggesting that the unhealthy food choices of Americans are 
less than fully voluntary is that such choices are known to be subject to the well-
known cognitive defect of hyperbolic discounting.149 The basic idea of hyperbolic 
discounting is that persons tend to have stronger preferences for immediate payoffs 
relative to later payoffs, with the discount rate increasing sharply the closer the 
payoffs are to the present.150 This can lead to preference-reversals.151 For example, 
one might strongly prefer $100 on January 2, 2013 over $90 on January 1, 2013 yet 
prefer $90 today to $100 tomorrow.152 Such individuals are likely to make choices 
today that their future self will come to regret.153 When making food selection 
decisions, individuals that exhibit hyperbolic discounting are likely to heavily 
discount long-term health risks and come to regret those decisions later.154 If the 
phenomenon of hyperbolic discounting leads individuals to make rather impulsive 
food choices, the voluntariness of those choices will be diminished.   
There is a ninth and final reason to think that unhealthy food choices may be less 
than voluntary. Consider that “[m]any scientists agree that lifelong taste preferences 
and eating habits are directly linked to what and how we eat in our early years, 
possibly as early as within the womb.”155 If this is true, then adult preferences for 
food have largely developed and solidified during years of childhood, and what an 
adult prefers to eat today would thus be, to a significant extent, determined by what 
he consumed in his formative years.156 It is clear, however, that he had little control 
over the food that he was given as a child; hence, the fact that he prefers hamburgers, 
fries, and other high-fat foods today may be due to the fact that he was fed such 
things as a child.157 Consequently, such unhealthy preferences may have been 
                                                          
ed., 1993).  Goodin notes: “there is the distinction between 'knowing intellectually‟ some 
statistic and 'feeling in your guts' its full implications.  Consent counts—morally, as well as 
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formed, to a certain extent, by factors entirely outside of his control. Moreover, as an 
adult, it might be exceptionally difficult for him to change his unhealthy, 
substantially non-voluntarily acquired food preferences, at least without external 
help. This is another sense in which unhealthy food choices can be seen to be less 
than fully voluntary.   
The above explication of factors that reduce the voluntariness of unhealthy food 
choices are not exhaustive.158 On the contrary, the purpose of the list is simply to 
demonstrate that  the decisions of countless Americans to indulge in unhealthy diets 
may be  significantly less than fully voluntary. As we have seen, unhealthy food 
selections may frequently be the result of: (i) partial or incorrect information with 
respect to the health risks; (ii) an inadequate understanding of those risks; (iii) 
inertia; (iv) a dearth of alternative options; or (v) other cognitive and volitional 
defects. In sum, there is good reason to think that the unhealthy food choices of 
Americans are substantially less than fully voluntary. 
2.  If the Unhealthy Food Choices of Americans Are to a Significant Extent Non-
Voluntary, Does this Sanction Paternalistic Interference? 
If the unhealthy food choices of Americans are significantly less than fully 
voluntary, the paternalism objection to anti-obesity legislation loses a lot of its bite. 
The paternalism objection will not hold up if food choices are substantially non-
voluntary because the two standard anti-paternalism arguments apply with little 
force if this is the case. Recall once more the consequentialist anti-paternalism 
argument which states that, due to superior information and incentive with respect to 
her own good, an individual is better placed than an external agent to promote that 
good.159 This paternalism objection is not particularly worrisome if unhealthy food 
choices are substantially non-voluntary, for a variety of reasons.  
First, there is reason to believe that (in the case of food choices) it is the 
government, and not the individual, that possesses superior information about the 
individuals‟ own good.160 In making any food choice, the best choice with respect to 
an individual‟s own good must be the choice that maximizes that good. In 
determining the best choice, one must balance various goods, such as the short-term 
pleasures derived from consuming a particular product, against the costs of doing so, 
such as health risks, economic costs from purchasing the product, and inconvenience 
costs from procuring the food.161   
Importantly, there is good reason to think that the government possesses superior 
knowledge concerning the health risks, and/or benefits of various foods, which is 
one of the important variables in the decision-making process of deciding what to 
                                                          
 158 Moreover, some factors may reduce the voluntariness of food choices only marginally 
while others may substantially do so.  
 159 See supra, § IV(A). 
 160 For example, the FDA, with its cadre of food scientists, has access to the most accurate 
and up to date information concerning the nutritional content of various foods.  The average 
person, by contrast, can hardly be said to possess such a sophisticated understanding of 
nutrition. 
 161 Some of these costs are short term, such as inconvenience costs, whereas others, such as 
health and economic costs, are long term. 
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eat. 162 Indeed, due to the effects of manipulative advertising, a dearth of conspicuous 
nutritional information, inertia, and general ignorance, there is reason to believe that 
individuals make their food choices based on a seriously inadequate understanding 
of health risks and/or benefits. In contrast, the government possesses detailed 
information about the risks of unhealthy eating, the nutritional content of various 
foods, etc.163 One might conclude that the government, with its superior information, 
will often make better food choices in terms of an individual‟s own good than will 
that individual herself.   
One might object here that, as we have seen, health is not the only variable that 
one considers in deciding what to eat. For example, one must also evaluate the short-
term pleasures derived from consuming unhealthy food. Further, the individual, not 
the government, certainly has superior information with respect to what foods give 
her the most satisfaction. Thus, it might be argued that, for the sake of her own good, 
the individual should be the one to balance the pleasures she receives from eating 
unhealthy foods against the associated health risks.   
While the individual may be better equipped than the government at balancing 
the short-term pleasures against the true long-term health costs, she is in no position 
to do so if she makes her decisions based upon a seriously distorted view of these 
health risks or fails to take them into account at all. Thus, due to its superior 
knowledge of the health risks and benefits of particular foods, there is reason to think 
that at least certain types of government anti-obesity policies will improve an 
individual‟s food decisions, according to her own standards.   
Second, in the present context of food choices, there is even reason to question 
the assertion (made by the consequentialist anti-paternalism argument) that the 
individual has a better incentive than the government to promote her own good. 
While the individual, of course, has very strong reasons to promote her own health, 
as we have seen, a number of pressures exist that work to substantially weaken her 
natural inclinations to do so.164 These include inertia, implanted evolutionary drives 
to prefer high-fat, high-salt, and high-sugar diets, and the well-known phenomenon 
of hyperbolic discounting.165 Moreover, to the extent that an individual does not fully 
know or understand the risks of eating an unhealthy diet, she will not possess an 
appropriate incentive to refrain from unhealthy foods, as she will not be aware that 
doing so is in the interests of her long-term health. For all of the above reasons, one 
might question whether an individual has a better incentive to care for her interests, 
including her health, than does the government. On the contrary, anti-obesity 
legislation, which is not subject to such forces as evolutionary urges and cognitive 
biases, may very well do a better job at promoting the individual's own good. 
If the unhealthy food choices of Americans are substantially non-voluntary, then 
there is reason to think that the government may have both (i) superior information 
and (ii) superior incentive with respect to an individual‟s best food choices. If so, the 
consequentialist anti-paternalism argument cannot serve as a bar to government 
intervention in the food industry.  
                                                          
 162 Health can be relatively uncontroversially presumed to be a good that everyone wants.  
 163 See generally Foods, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, http://www.fda.gov/ 
Food/default.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2011). 
 164 See supra, §IV(C)(1)(ii). 
 165 See supra, §IV(C)(1)(ii). 
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But does the second anti-paternalism argument, which claims that paternalism 
conflicts with autonomy, serve as a bar to government anti-obesity legislation 
supported on paternalistic grounds? It has already been demonstrated that the force 
of this objection is considerably diminished when the paternalist only attempts to 
intervene with choices that fall significantly short of being fully voluntary. If our 
unhealthy food selections are, to a large extent, based upon non-voluntary factors 
outside of our conscious awareness and control, then, to the extent that government 
policy interferes with such choices merely to mitigate the effects of these 
voluntariness-reducing factors, the champion of autonomy should not be concerned. 
Indeed, government policy that seeks merely to counter the various voluntariness-
reducing factors will in fact enhance autonomy, for the soft or weak paternalist does 
not wish to override another‟s voluntary choices; on the contrary, she merely hopes 
to ensure that an individual‟s choices are truly her own.166   
With respect to anti-obesity regulation specifically, the goal of the soft or weak 
paternalist is to ensure that unhealthy food choices are not made by reason of 
ignorance, or only because one fails to adequately grasp the associated health 
risks.167 In addition, she attempts to prevent persons from being pressured into 
making unhealthy choices because such unhealthy options are the only or only 
realistic choice. She thus advocates for the increased availability of healthy options 
in restaurants, for subsidies of healthy options in impoverished neighborhoods, etc. 
She also advocates for the altering of the background food milieu in a decidedly 
healthy direction, so that persons who make food choices based upon little or no 
thought, will no longer choose the unhealthy option by default. Persons who still 
prefer to eat unhealthy foods would need to make a voluntary, active choice to do so. 
Finally, she seeks to minimize the extent to which persons are coerced into their 
unhealthy eating habits by manipulative advertising, early childhood socialization, or 
implanted evolutionary drives.   
In sum, the soft or weak paternalist does not wish to coerce anyone to eat a 
healthy, government-approved diet. By looking to minimize the various factors that 
reduce the voluntariness of one‟s diet, she actually wishes to promote and further 
one‟s gastronomical autonomy. The soft or weak paternalist is the true defender of 
one‟s right to eat what one wants.  
As already demonstrated, there is a strong prima facie case for government anti-
obesity legislation due to the severe social costs of obesity and the fact that the 
government is the agent best-placed to address the epidemic. The one obstacle 
standing in the way of aggressive government action is the paternalism objection. If, 
however, the unhealthy food choices of Americans are substantially non-voluntary, 
then the two classic anti-paternalism arguments are unlikely to bar all paternalistic 
government anti-obesity policies.   
                                                          
 166 Just as physical coercion or threats of such coercion function to reduce the voluntariness 
of one's choices, factors such as manipulative advertising, lack of accurate information, and 
evolutionary predisposition can diminish one's ability to make voluntary choices.  Indeed, 
such factors can be just as powerful and debilitating as applied external pressures.   
 167 Even if individuals continue to make such choices in ignorance (i.e., persons continue 
to make seemingly foolish decisions, despite knowing the risks).  
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3.  What Kinds of Anti-Obesity Policies Would Be Justified on Paternalistic 
Grounds? 
It may both be true that Americans‟ unhealthy food choices are substantially non-
voluntary and that the standard anti-paternalism arguments do not justify prohibiting 
all forms of paternalistic interference with our food choices. This does not mean, 
however, that any and all paternalistic anti-obesity policies are thereby justified. For 
example, no one would support jailing fast-food patrons, even if it was for their own 
good. So what kinds of anti-obesity policies can be justified on paternalistic 
grounds?  
As an initial matter, we might support policies that aim to directly counteract one 
or more of the specific voluntariness-reducing factors enumerated earlier. For 
example, full disclosure laws could be implemented to counteract informational 
deficiencies, or compelled speech advertising laws (or advertising bans) could be 
passed to counter the effect of manipulative advertising.168 Assuming such policies 
are not unduly intrusive, they should be relatively uncontroversial as they would 
only look to counter the effects of a specific voluntariness-reducing factor.   
Indeed, such policies promote individual autonomy by eliminating voluntariness-
reducing factors that threaten it.169 The “paternalism conflicts with autonomy” 
objection should not bar such policies. Moreover, by looking to neutralize 
voluntariness-reducing factors that lead to unreflective food choices, they should be 
thought to further the good (especially the health) of individuals better than would an 
absence of legislation.170 Therefore, neither should the consequentialist anti-
paternalism objection bar such measures.   
If many of the voluntariness-reducing factors discussed cannot be directly 
neutralized, it is nonetheless possible to mitigate the influence of these 
voluntariness-reducing factors on our food choices. This can be done by enacting 
policies that make unhealthy food choices relatively less attractive overall, and, by 
extension, healthy food choices comparatively more attractive.     
For example, we might institute a “fat tax,” and/or health food and exercise 
subsidies.171 A “fat tax” would not directly attack any particular voluntariness-
reducing factor. Instead, it would attempt to tilt the scales of the overall food 
environment in favor of a healthy diet. This would vitiate the various voluntariness-
reducing factors that increase the probability of an individual choosing an unhealthy 
                                                          
 168 As previously discussed, full disclosure laws and compelled speech regulation could 
most likely also be justified on non-paternalistic grounds as such policies are arguably not 
paternalistic at all; however, even assuming them to be paternalistic in nature, they could 
nonetheless be justified.  As for advertising bans, they are certainly paternalistic, and thus, 
could not be justified on non-paternalistic grounds.   
 169 Thus, the “paternalism conflicts with autonomy” objection should not bar such policies.  
 170 Hence, the consequentialist anti-paternalism objection should not bar such policies.  
 171 See, e.g., Tatiana Andreyeva et. al., The Impact of Food Prices on Consumption: A 
Systematic Review of Research on the Price Elasticity of Demand for Food, 100 AM. J. OF 
PUB. HEALTH, 216-22 (2010); Kelly D. Brownell, The Public Health and Economic Benefits of 
Taxing Sugar-Sweetened Beverages, NEW ENG. J. MED. 1-7 (2009);  Soft Drink Taxes: A 
Policy Brief, YALE CTR. FOR FOOD POLICY & OBESITY (2009), available at  
http://www.yaleruddcenter.org/resources/upload/docs/what/reports/RuddReportSoftDrinkTax
Fall2009.pdf. 
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option. Taxes and subsidies would do this by making unhealthy food relatively more 
expensive (and thus less desirable), and healthy food relatively less expensive (and 
thus more desirable). Such measures have been shown to be effective.172 
These policies would mitigate the effect of voluntariness-reducing factors and 
allow persons to make maximally autonomous food decisions. The purpose would be 
merely the elimination of voluntariness-reducing factors in an attempt to promote 
genuine autonomy. Hence, such policies show respect for autonomy and choice, if 
anything. Therefore, such policies should not be defeated by the “paternalism 
conflicts with autonomy” objection. Because there is good reason to think that 
individuals significantly discount the health risks associated with eating unhealthy 
food, as previously discussed, there is good reason to believe that anti-obesity 
policies that shift the eating environment in a less obesogenic direction will promote 
the good of individuals better than in the absence of such legislation. Thus, the 
consequentialist anti-paternalism objection should likewise be thought not to bar 
policies of this kind.173    
4.  Can More Heavy-Handed Anti-Obesity Policies Be  
Justified on Hard Paternalism Grounds? 
This Article has argued that several anti-obesity policies (including educational 
and full disclosure laws, subsidies of healthy products, and taxes on particularly 
unhealthful foods) can be justified based upon: (1) the harm principle; (2) other non-
paternalistic principles, such as reasonably presumed popular consent or approval; 
and/or (3) soft or weak paternalism. If such policies are implemented, Americans 
will become well aware of both the serious risks of an unhealthy lifestyle and of the 
nutritional content of the particular foods that they consume. Moreover, healthy 
options would be made widely available, and the background gastronomical context 
would be shifted in a decidedly healthful direction so that healthy eating could 
increasingly become the default choice. These policies would diminish the frequency 
of unhealthy eating by, inter alia, reason of ignorance, lack of choice, and inertia. 
Taken together, such changes promise to significantly reduce the incidence of 
obesity.   
                                                          
 172 See, e.g., Andreyeva et. al. supra note 171; Brownell, supra note 171; YALE CTR. FOR 
FOOD POLICY & OBESITY, supra note 171.   
 173 An anticipated objection to such a policy is that “fat taxes” or health food subsidies 
would push everyone‟s food preferences in a healthy direction, including those who are not 
significantly compromised by voluntariness-reducing factors..  Hence, it would punish those 
fully informed and fully competent adults for their completely voluntary self-regarding 
decisions.  In answering such a critic one could concede that with respect to this particular 
class of individuals they may well be correct that such a law would be unjustified.  However, 
that being said, the administrative and other costs associated with finding and exempting such 
individuals would likely be too high to include such an exception.   This would be a cost a 
government planner would simply be forced to bear.  
Another question a government planner would have to consider is that of how much to tax 
unhealthy products, or how much to subsidize healthy options.  While settling the exact 
amount is not a question that is appropriate to answer in this Article, theoretically, the 
combination of taxes and subsidies would be justified if together they changed the food 
landscape enough towards a healthy direction to mitigate all of the effects felt from the 
various voluntariness-reducing factors described.   
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Even if such policies turn out to be effective, it is nonetheless extremely 
implausible to suppose that they would entirely eliminate the obesity problem.174 If 
so, some anti-obesity advocates might call for the implementation of further, more 
intrusive, measures to stem obesity. For example, they could push for: (1) more 
aggressive “fat taxes” aimed at completely destroying the market for (and preventing 
the consumption of) unhealthy products; (2) the rationing of unhealthy food; (3) the 
medicalization of such foods (i.e. requiring that unhealthy food be obtained via 
prescription); (4) outright bans on certain products; and/or (5) criminal penalties for 
selling or possessing particular foods.   
It is clear that such heavy-handed measures could only be justified by a hard 
paternalism rationale. A ban on hamburgers, for example, could not be justified by 
either the harm principle or by weak paternalism. While the harm principle would 
justify requiring the hamburger-eater to pick up the costs due to his over-indulgence 
(as previously discussed), he could simply be made to pay these costs in the form of 
a tax on his unhealthy consumption (or otherwise). A ban would go well beyond the 
mere recoupment of societal costs.   
Moreover, such a ban could not be supported on weak or soft paternalism 
grounds. Even if all of the previously-discussed voluntariness-reducing factors were 
eliminated or neutralized, many persons would nonetheless voluntarily choose to eat 
unhealthy foods. Any attempt to alter this voluntary behavior would exceed the 
scope of the soft paternalism mandate and cross the line into hard paternalism. 
In sum, the only cogent reason for instituting such a complete ban would be to 
subordinate one‟s voluntary choice to his supposed good, the raison d’être of the 
hard paternalist. Similarly, policies such as excessive taxation designed to destroy 
the market for (and consumption of) unhealthy products, and the rationing, 
medicalization, and criminalization of unhealthy products could only be supported 
by a hard paternalism rationale.175   
Since the above-mentioned heavy-handed policies can only be justified by 
appealing to hard paternalism, whether they are in fact justified will depend upon: 
(1) whether hard paternalism is ever justified and (2) assuming that it is, whether it 
justifies the types of anti-obesity policies that the committed hard paternalist may 
want to bring to bear, such as the banning of particular food products.   
                                                          
 174 Undoubtedly many persons will, entirely voluntarily, choose to habitually consume 
unhealthy food.  
 175 Excessive taxation designed to destroy the market for (and consumption of) unhealthy 
products would be equivalent to a ban.  Moreover, any level of taxation above that permitted 
by the harm principle, reasonably presumed societal consent, and soft paternalism should be 
seen to be only justifiable on hard paternalism grounds for such taxation would look to 
override one's voluntary choices for one‟s own good.   
  Rationing would prevent individuals from voluntarily “over-consuming,” and thus, 
would require a hard paternalism basis.  Medicalization, assuming that unhealthy products 
would only be dispensed based upon the wisdom and consent of one‟s physician, would also 
require a hard paternalism basis as one‟s voluntary decision to consume unhealthy products 
would be both cumbersome and subject to veto by one‟s doctor.  Finally, criminal prohibitions 
would potentially punish individuals for their voluntary food choices and hence would require 
a hard paternalism grounding.  
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i.  Is Hard Paternalism Ever Justified? 
Several commentators have argued that hard paternalism, paternalistic 
interference that overrides an individual‟s voluntary choice for the purpose of 
furthering his own good, is never justified.176 This antipathy towards hard 
paternalism is based chiefly upon the two anti-paternalism arguments previously 
considered: the consequentialist and the “autonomy-based” anti-paternalism 
arguments.177 
The consequentialist anti-paternalist argument may very well succeed in 
establishing a strong presumption against any proposed hard paternalistic 
interference.178 After all, it seems that an individual who is informed of all of the 
relevant risks and benefits of his proposed course of action, and who is free of 
significant volitional or cognitive defects, is much more likely, due to his superior 
knowledge and motive with respect to his own good, to promote that good than 
would an external agent.179 Indeed, this may be so in the vast majority of cases. If so, 
there should be a strong presumption against any proposed hard paternalistic 
interference.   
Nonetheless, the consequentialist anti-paternalism argument cannot reasonably 
be thought to support an absolute ban on hard paternalism, as it is in the very nature 
of consequentialist reasoning to provide for exceptions. Consider, for example, one 
who voluntarily, knowing all the risks, decides to sell himself into slavery to a 
known brutal master for no articulated reason. Such a choice, regardless of how 
voluntary it is, would seem to result in negative consequences overall. To deny this 
would be to dogmatically cling to the belief that an individual who acts voluntarily 
necessarily best promotes his own good. If hard paternalism is never justified, it 
cannot be on the strength of the consequentialist anti-paternalism argument.   
Another consequentialist argument has been employed against hard paternalism; 
specifically, the “argument from the developmental value of choice.”180 This 
argument recognizes that making one‟s own choices is essential to the development 
of one‟s ability to function effectively as a rational chooser.181 The argument 
contends that, like the mollycoddled child unable to function effectively in college 
away from the protective family nest, or the released institutionalized prisoner who 
does not know how to function in the absence of prison structure, the coddled citizen 
                                                          
 176 Perhaps the most prominent recent opponent of hard paternalism has been Joel 
Feinberg. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 24, 
98, 119 (1986). 
 177 See, e.g., id. at 58-60; KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 28-30. 
 178 Recall that the consequentialist anti-paternalist argument states that, due to both 
superior information and motive with respect to one‟s own good, a paternalistic interference 
for the sake of that good is most likely to backfire, resulting in negative consequences overall. 
See section IV(A). As we have seen, when an individual's choice is significantly non-
voluntary, this anti-paternalist argument is quite weak. It has considerably more bite when 
employed against the hard paternalist.   
 179 See, e.g., Mill, supra note 56.   
 180 See, e.g., KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 30-32.   
 181 Id.   
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will lose the ability to function effectively without the guiding hand of the state.182 
While such concerns are legitimate, the argument only seems plausible if the state‟s 
paternalistic interference is wide in scope, covering many areas of one‟s life. For 
example, in a hypothetical theological state where the lives of citizens are regulated 
in minute detail, the worry that persons may lose their capacity to function 
effectively as rational choosers might be a pressing concern. If the state‟s hard 
paternalistic interference is strictly limited in scope, however, (i.e., to only some 
activities), the argument loses its plausibility. For example, seatbelt laws and other 
similar safety regulations justified on a hard paternalist rationale should not give 
much cause for concern that citizens will lose their ability to effectively think for 
themselves or to plan their lives.     
The “autonomy-based” anti-paternalist argument holds the most promising 
justification for an absolute ban against hard paternalism. According to this 
objection, the hard paternalist, by disregarding and overriding one‟s voluntary 
choices, usurps and thereby ignores that person‟s autonomy, and his individuality.183 
Hard paternalism disrespects autonomy.184   
Most people appear to at least implicitly subscribe to this objection, as persons 
do not typically appreciate even a well-meaning individual purporting to deny them 
the right to make their own decisions.185 Neither do they appreciate the paternalist‟s 
contention that he knows what is best for them.186 They might state that the 
prospective paternalist has no business telling them what to do with their own life, 
communicating their belief that an external agent has no right to interfere with their 
own voluntary self-regarding behavior.187 In sum, their objection is that hard 
paternalism disrespects their autonomy.188   
Importantly, the argument that hard paternalism disrespects autonomy applies in 
every case of hard paternalistic interference because, in every hard paternalistic 
interference, the hard paternalist usurps the target individual‟s autonomy by ignoring 
and overriding her voluntary choice(s).189 Thus, in any proposed hard paternalistic 
intervention the prospective paternalist must demonstrate why the planned 
interference merits the overriding of the target individual‟s autonomy.190  
While overcoming the autonomy-based anti-paternalism argument is certainly 
not an easy task, many scholars have argued that it can be successfully done in 
certain circumstances.191 Four of the most prominent justifications include: (1) the 
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 183 See, e.g., KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 28; FEINBERG, supra note 176, at 57-62. 
 184 See, e.g., KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 28; FEINBERG, supra note 176, at 57-62. 
 185 See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 176, at 98. 
 186 Id.   
 187 Id.   
 188 Id.   
 189 Richard Arneson, Joel Feinberg and the Justification of Hard Paternalism, 11 LEGAL 
THEORY 259, 263-65 (2005). 
 190 Id.   
 191 See, e.g., KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 67-74; Arneson, supra note 189.   
2012] TIME TO CUT THE FAT 73 
 
argument from freedom maximization; (2) the argument in defense of one‟s future 
self; (3) the argument based upon hypothetical rational consent; and (4) the argument 
from integrity.192   
One purported justification of hard paternalism, the argument from freedom 
maximization, states that a particular hard paternalistic interference may be justified 
if (in the unusual case) it functions to increase one‟s overall freedom.193 For 
example, bans on smoking and fatty foods might increase freedom in the long-run by 
substantially improving both the health and number of the individual‟s later years. 
The problem with this response is that it misconstrues the autonomy-based objection 
against hard paternalism. The objection does not protest against the usurpation of 
freedom per se; rather, it objects to the usurpation of one‟s autonomy, the right to 
make one‟s own voluntary decisions now, even if such choices might, in some sense, 
limit one‟s freedom in the long-run.194 Banning smoking and fatty foods would 
seriously limit one‟s ability to make one‟s own lifestyle decisions now, even if such 
measures would increase his long-term freedom. Thus, such policies would run afoul 
of the “autonomy-based” objection.195   
A second supposed defense of hard paternalism, the argument in defense of one‟s 
future self, also fails.196 This argument contends that the usurpation of one‟s 
voluntary choices for one‟s own good may be justified where one‟s “future self” 
would (or at least can be reasonably expected to) consent to such interference.197 We 
might imagine, for example, that a motorcyclist who opts not to wear a helmet would 
change his mind were he to become seriously injured.198 Thus, his “future self” 
might be said to consent to a mandate that he wear a helmet now.199 Although such 
an argument is superficially appealing, it is rife with problems. What one‟s future 
self would actually consent to is highly speculative, and even if one‟s future self later 
regretted an earlier foolish action, she might still object to some busybody‟s forceful 
interference with her earlier self. Moreover, the argument would seriously limit the 
scope of one‟s autonomy, one‟s capacity to choose for oneself, as one‟s decisions 
would consistently be threatened with the veto of a future, unknown, and alien 
being.200   
A third prominent strategy has been to contend that hard paternalism may 
sometimes be justified based upon “hypothetical rational consent.”201 The idea here 
                                                          
 192 See, e.g., KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 51-73. 
 193 KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 53-55.   
 194 Id. at 54-55.   
 195 Another problem with this argument is that it would seem to prove too much. If 
accepted, it would seem to justify a whole range of intrusive measures regulating one's 
lifestyle, from the prohibition of pub crawls to sunbathing. 
 196 See, e.g., KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 45-48. 
 197 See, e.g., id.     
 198 Id. at 47.   
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 200 For a summary of some of these, and other, problems, see id. at 46-47. 
 201 Id., at 63-67; see also FEINBERG, supra note 176, at 184-86.   
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is that if a rational person would consent to a particular action (or inaction), then a 
paternalistic interference to ensure that one performs that action (or not) is 
justifiable.202 This response is also deeply troubling, as it sanctions the ignoring and 
overriding of the real, expressed wishes of an individual in favor of the desires of a 
mythical rational person.203 Thus, it sanctions forcing an individual to be rational. 
This defense of hard paternalism disrespects one‟s autonomy by, inter alia, rejecting 
one‟s right to take certain risks or to live what may be deemed to be an unjustifiably 
risky lifestyle. Moreover, because “there is a tendency for the rational individual to 
reflect the understanding and values of upholders of power or the dominant ideology 
. . . [hypothetical rational consent is] prey to idiosyncrasy and partisan 
constructions.”204 In sum, it hardly seems a viable defense of hard paternalism. 
The most promising defense of hard paternalism is the “argument from 
integrity,” which contends that when an individual endeavors to make a choice (1) 
for trivial reasons;205 (2) that promises insignificant benefits; and (3) such a choice 
puts in jeopardy one‟s core life projects, goals, or values; then (4) one may be 
justified in overriding that choice for that individual‟s own good.206 As John Kleinig 
states: 
Where our conduct or choices place our more permanent, stable, and central 
projects in jeopardy, and where what comes to expression in this conduct or these 
choices manifests aspects of our personality that do not rank highly in our 
constellation of desires, dispositions, etc., benevolent interference will not constitute 
a violation of integrity. Indeed, if anything, it helps to preserve it.207 It is not to 
voluntary choices as such that liberalism is committed, but to the persons who 
express themselves in their choices. Where choices having marginal significance to a 
person‟s settled life-plans and values threaten serious disruption to their realization, 
we do not violate their integrity in interfering with them.208  
Consider, for example, seat belt laws criminalizing (albeit with a modest fine) all 
those who refuse to wear seat belts. The argument from integrity would defend these 
laws on hard paternalistic grounds because: (1) those who do not wear seatbelts 
typically do so for trivial reasons, such as laziness; (2) not wearing a seatbelt 
provides, at best, relatively insignificant benefits, such as a marginal increase in 
comfort; and (3) failing to buckle-up dramatically increases the risk of serious injury 
or death, putting in jeopardy one‟s life projects and goals.209 In such a case, a 
paternalistic interference is thought to be justified because the purpose of the 
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intervention is to preserve and protect one‟s cherished values, goals, and life 
projects. The intervention is in defense of one‟s integrity.210  
A particular strength of this justificatory strategy is that it both enables the 
paternalist to prevent an individual from making especially dangerous and foolish 
decisions lacking any sort of redeeming value, and, at the same time, forces the 
paternalist to respect an individual‟s voluntary choices made in furtherance of any 
significant individual end, regardless of how risky, foolish, or irrational those 
decisions may appear to be.211 For example, we might conclude that the death-
defying motorcycle stunts performed by the late Evel Knievel were indefensibly 
risky, foolish and even irrational; nonetheless, because such stunts were performed 
by the daredevil in furtherance of ends that he found to be important, we would be 
unable to interfere.   
While it is true that such a paternalist would limit one‟s ability to make trivial, 
potentially life-destroying decisions, she would maximize one‟s ability to live the 
life that she wants and would not get in the way of her decision to achieve any of her 
even mildly important ends.212 On the contrary, the paternalist would be a supporter 
and defender of her integrity.   
ii.  Can Hard Paternalism Justify More Aggressive  
Anti-Obesity Policies Such as Product Bans? 
It has been argued above that the consequentialist anti-paternalism argument is 
incapable of justifying an absolute ban on hard paternalism, but that it may succeed 
in establishing a strong presumption against hard paternalistic interference. Turning 
to the specific case of anti-obesity legislation, a strong presumption against anti-
obesity legislation is warranted based upon such consequentialist reasoning. To see 
why, consider an illustrative case of hard paternalistic interference: a ban on 
hamburgers.   
It seems very likely that a ban on hamburgers or other fatty food products would 
result in an overall diminishment of one‟s good. While it is true that the banning of 
particular unhealthy foods might marginally (or even significantly) improve one‟s 
health, the negative effects flowing from such a ban are very likely to outweigh any 
positive benefits. Inter alia, banning such foods may: (1) deprive individuals of the 
various pleasures associated with consuming these foods, such as the pleasures of 
taste, smell, anticipation, and psychological comfort; (2) lead to feelings of deep 
resentment from being told what to do; (3) reduce one‟s ability to properly regulate 
her own diet; (4) result in the increased use of other harmful products, such as 
alcohol or drugs in an effort to compensate for the lack of comforting fatty foods; (5) 
lead to the creation of a black market for fatty foods and a concomitant increase in 
criminal activity and disrespect for the law; and (6) result in decreased tax revenues. 
In sum, a ban on unhealthy products that individuals enjoy, such as hamburgers 
and doughnuts, would likely have very negative consequences. While one must be 
open to the possibility that, in particular cases of hard paternalistic food regulation, 
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the consequentialist calculus would come out positive,213 it seems that this would not 
typically be the case. Thus, it may be prudent to adopt a strong presumption against 
bans and other aggressive anti-obesity policies underwritten by hard paternalism. At 
the very least, it seems legitimate to put the burden of proof on the one arguing in 
favor of such regulation.  
While a strong presumption against hard paternalistic food regulation may be 
justified, as discussed above, this can merely be a presumption and cannot rule out 
every possible case of food regulation supported by hard paternalism. Can the 
argument from autonomy rule out every such policy?  
Although the “argument from autonomy” does rule out most instances of hard 
paternalism, it is subject to the “argument from integrity” exception, and thus it 
cannot rule out all cases of hard paternalistic interference. However, it may 
nonetheless proscribe the great majority of anti-obesity policies underwritten by such 
a rationale as most anti-obesity policies supported by hard paternalism cannot be 
seen to fall under the exception. For example, the integrity exception would not 
support bans of popular products such as hamburgers, fries, sugar, and salt. For even 
if the various voluntariness-reducing factors discussed earlier were eliminated or 
neutralized, such that food choices could be deemed to be sufficiently voluntary, 
many persons would likely continue to consume these foods for non-trivial reasons. 
Many individuals would continue to voluntarily consume unhealthy snacks and 
meals because they greatly enjoy, inter alia, the taste of these foods, the anticipation 
of eating such foods, or the psychological comfort that these foods provide.   
In more extreme cases, eating particular unhealthy foods may constitute part of 
one‟s core identity or life-plan. For example, the immigrant who continues to eat a 
diet of her local dishes typically does so because she has become accustomed to the 
taste and doing so provides a link to her home country. Thus, it helps to sustain her 
original identity. Similarly, the gourmand may make a lifestyle out of tasting and 
consuming delectable (and very likely unhealthy) foods.  
When persons voluntarily consume unhealthy foods, they typically do so for 
reasons related to their particular conception of the good. While the choice to eat fast 
food three times a day is surely imprudent, and possibly even irrational, to deny one 
the opportunity to voluntarily do so would seriously limit one‟s autonomy, one‟s 
ability to make one‟s own life decisions. The hard paternalist, who denies an 
individual the opportunity to eat poorly, disrespects her autonomy, and expresses 
contempt for her chosen conception of the good—her chosen life-plan. Thus, a 
paternalistic intervention that ignores and overrides the individual‟s desire to eat a 
particular diet threatens, rather than supports, her integrity. Hence, it is not justifiable 
under the integrity exception.      
Is any type of aggressive food regulation backed by hard paternalism justifiable? 
Could any food product be justifiably banned? The answer is yes, if the banning of 
the particular food product would promise positive consequentialist results and 
would find shelter under the integrity exception to the “autonomy-based” objection 
to hard paternalism. As discussed previously, fatty and otherwise unhealthy foods 
that persons enjoy would not meet these criteria; certain products such as trans-fatty 
acids (“trans-fats”) and spoiled food, however, may qualify.   
                                                          
 213 It is in the nature of consequentialist reasoning to provide for exceptions and it would be 
presumptuous to simply assume that no exceptions exist.   
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Consider the recent trans-fats bans instituted in several cities.214 It has been 
alleged both that trans-fats are extremely dangerous to one‟s long-term health and 
that they have no distinctive taste.215 If this is true, there is a strong argument for the 
banning of trans-fats on hard paternalism grounds because the consumption of trans-
fats would simultaneously provide no benefits, result in virtually no loss to one‟s 
freedom, and seriously threaten one‟s health and one‟s values, goals, and life 
projects. Trans-fats could be banned in defense of one‟s integrity. On similar 
grounds, currently prohibited products, such as spoiled milk and contaminated meat, 
can be justifiably banned. 
In sum, hard paternalism does not provide a convincing ground for much anti-
obesity regulation. A policy supported only by hard paternalism, such as a ban on 
hamburgers or doughnuts, would go significantly beyond an attempt to merely 
mitigate the several voluntariness-reducing factors that decrease the extent to which 
unhealthy food choices are voluntary. Indeed, assuming that Americans were fully 
aware of the risks of unhealthy food and did not suffer from any of the voluntariness-
reducing factors that have been enumerated, some would still fully voluntarily 
choose to indulge in unhealthy foods from time to time.  
Any sort of ban on popular unhealthy products would completely override the 
voluntary self-regarding choices of individuals, and thus, would constitute an 
extreme interference with liberty. The consequences of such a ban are also very 
likely to be dire; hence, there should be a strong presumption against such a blunt 
policy instrument. Moreover, such a ban or other similar heavy-handed policy would 
need to overcome the “autonomy-based” objection to hard paternalism. While some 
food policies might overcome both the consequentialist presumption and the 
autonomy-based objection, such policies would be the rare exception, and would 
essentially only justify the banning of high-risk, no-utility products. Such limited 
bans would hardly be enough to win the war on obesity.   
In sum, few potentially effective anti-obesity policies justified exclusively by 
hard paternalism can be thought to be legitimate. Progress in fighting obesity must 
come primarily from the alternative rationales previously discussed. Fortunately, 
those rationales sanction the implementation of numerous policies that are likely to 
effectively reduce the incidence of American obesity.  
V.  THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OBJECTION TO GOVERNMENT ANTI-OBESITY REGULATION 
The paternalism objection to government regulation of obesity contends that anti-
obesity legislation constitutes unjustified paternalism.216 While this objection should 
be taken seriously and should be seen to prohibit the implementation of many more 
aggressive and heavy-handed policies, such as bans on or the rationing of fatty 
foods, the force of the objection should not be overstated. Inter alia, anti-obesity 
education policies, advertising restrictions, full-disclosure laws, subsidies, and taxes 
can all be justified. These measures are either supported on non-paternalism grounds, 
and thus avoid the paternalism objection entirely, or can be otherwise justified 
notwithstanding the paternalism objection. This Article has argued that the case for 
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these sorts of policies is compelling. Before making a final recommendation, 
however, this paper will examine one last prominent objection to government anti-
obesity legislation—that of the “slippery slope.” 
The slippery slope objection, in the context of anti-obesity regulation, concedes 
that some anti-obesity policies (for example, full disclosure laws) might be 
unobjectionable (or even beneficial) by themselves; it contends, however, that the 
institution of even relatively mild government policies will lead to ever increasing 
regulation of one‟s diet and life.217 The idea is that through a series of small, similar 
or analogous steps, the first and relatively modest regulation A will lead to a slightly 
more intrusive regulation B, which will lead to C, then to D, and so forth.218 While A 
may be beneficial, D is quite objectionable; therefore, A should be opposed in the 
first place to avoid bringing about D.219   
Thus, while requiring fast-food outlets to post nutritional information may be 
relatively benign, since doing so would purportedly lead to much more draconian 
restrictions later (such as total fast-food bans), the first, relatively mild, step should 
be opposed now to avoid the highly undesirable consequences that await us at the 
bottom of the slope.   
There are two versions of the “slippery slope,” argument, both of which are 
employed to argue against government anti-obesity regulation: (1) the conceptual or 
quasi-logical version; and (2) the causal version.220 
The conceptual or quasi-logical version of the argument contends that if there is 
no principled dividing line between two cases, A and D, then either A and D must 
both be accepted or both rejected.221 Allegedly, if A is accepted, then B must also be 
accepted, assuming that there is no principled distinction between A and B.222 Once 
B is accepted, C must also be recognized, since there is no principled distinction 
between B and C, and so on. In sum, sooner or later, one must accept D.223  
As applied to anti-obesity regulation, this conceptual slippery slope argument is 
completely unconvincing. First, even assuming that this argument has some weight, 
in the case of government anti-obesity regulation, there is a principled dividing line 
that distinguishes between legitimate and non-legitimate regulations. As this Article 
has argued in detail, a regulation based upon the harm principle, another non-
paternalistic principle, or soft or weak paternalism can be justified.224 On the other 
hand, a regulation that is supported only by hard paternalism is generally not 
                                                          
 217 See, e.g., HARSANYI, supra note 50, at 11, 30, 38, 128, 228; JAMES T. BENNETT & 
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(2005). 
 219 Volokh, supra note 218, at 1028; Lafollette, supra note 218, at 477. 
 220 See, e.g., Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 50.   
 221 See, e.g., FALLACY FILES, SLIPPERY SLOPE (2011), www.fallacyfiles.org/slipslop.html. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. 
 224 It would also have to promise to effectively fight obesity without the imposition of 
counteracting costs that would overtake the gains brought about by obesity reduction. 
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supportable, subject only to a very limited “integrity” exception. In short, there is no 
significant principled line-drawing problem. 
Second, even if there was no principle dividing line to distinguish between good 
and bad anti-obesity regulations, the argument still would not be convincing for it is 
a logical fallacy.225 Just because there is no clear dividing line between two concepts, 
A and D, it simply does not follow that there is no significant difference between the 
two.226 Indeed, a great enough difference in degree can amount to a difference in 
kind.227   
Consider a man with 10,000 hairs on his head.228 Such a man is not bald, and 
neither would he be bald if he had 9,999 hairs on his head. There is no significant 
difference between the two cases. Similarly, there is no significant difference 
between having 9,999 hairs on one‟s head and having 9,998, and so forth. Having 
one more hair never makes a significant difference such that a man would be bald in 
one case and not bald in the other. There is no significant or principled dividing line 
between being bald and not being bald. Nonetheless, there is a very significant 
difference between the bald man and the man with 10,000 hairs on his head.229 One 
man is bald, the other is not. This simply illustrates that a big enough difference in 
degree can come to constitute a difference in kind.230   
Here, even if no principled line existed between relatively modest anti-obesity 
policies and severe food regulations—intrusive regulations governing in strict detail 
every aspect of one‟s diet—it does not follow that draconian regulations would have 
to be accepted, such as bans on doughnuts, merely because more modest proposals 
were previously adopted. It would not be required any more than accepting that 
Mill‟s uncontroversial harm principle justifies the criminalization of murder would 
necessitate criminalizing every single behavior that harms another, such as rudeness 
or inane conversations. In sum, the conceptual or quasi-logical slippery slope 
argument is completely unconvincing. 
In addition to appealing to the conceptual or quasi-logical version of the slippery 
slope argument, anti-regulation activists have also appealed to a “causal” variant of 
the argument.231 This version concedes that taking a first, relatively mild, step into 
anti-obesity regulation, such as requiring fast-food outlets to post nutritional 
information, would not logically require accepting more draconian regulations; 
nonetheless, it argues that taking such a step will very likely lead to the later 
implementation of highly intrusive measures through some sort of causal 
mechanism.232 
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For example, perhaps taking that first step will have an “attitude-altering effect.” 
It might change persons‟ attitudes towards the propriety of anti-obesity regulations, 
perhaps inuring them to the idea, and thus, making them willing to countenance 
more intrusive regulations later on.233 Or maybe the phenomenon of “small change 
apathy” would lead to even stricter regulations. The idea here is that it is not worth 
one‟s limited time and energy to oppose small changes in regulation, so one may not 
oppose seemingly mild and non-intrusive regulation, but, through the continued 
ratcheting up of regulations, a very intrusive result may eventually come to pass.234 
Or perhaps health advocates, upon achieving a small victory, will gain political 
momentum and parlay this momentum into establishing ever more draconian 
policies.235 Finally, it is possible that these relatively modest regulations will do little 
to affect obesity rates; having already accepted the premise that it is the 
government‟s business to be involved in the war on obesity (and confronted with the 
failure of relatively benign regulations), however, the public might be tempted to 
support significantly more aggressive policies designed to solve the problem.236 
Whatever the precise causal process, the idea is that through some mechanism, 
adopting relatively mild regulations now will lead to much more intrusive measures 
later.   
Although widely employed, this “causal” slippery slope argument is rife with 
problems, the most pressing being it‟s highly speculative nature. It is important to 
note that the strength of the argument is inversely proportional to the number of 
causal chains in the argument and directly proportional to the strength of each of the 
chains.237 To wit, the more causal chains in the argument, the weaker the argument, 
and the weaker the empirical evidence associated with each chain (i.e. the evidence 
purporting to show that A leads to B), the weaker the argument.238 If a causal 
slippery slope argument is to be convincing, one must carefully lay out all of the 
steps and put forth reasonable evidence that each step will lead to the next.239   
Unfortunately, causal slippery slope arguments are frequently, if not typically, 
used to mask the lack of such hard evidence.240 For example, instead of outlining 
specific evidence as to why and how implementing A will lead to B, proponents of 
such arguments typically simply assert that A and B are on a slippery slope.241 Such 
a response, however, is just to make the conclusory statement that B will follow 
from A. The mention of the slippery slope between A and B, by itself, adds 
absolutely nothing to the argument; the reference to a “slippery slope” is merely 
rhetorical.242   
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There is good reason to be suspicious of causal slippery slope arguments in 
general, and, as applied to anti-obesity regulation, the causal slippery slope argument 
is hardly convincing. There is little reason to think that implementing modest anti-
obesity proposals (such as the conspicuous posting of nutritional information) will 
lead to bans of fatty foods, a Spartan-like regime regulating minute aspects of one‟s 
health and diet, or other similar types of heavy-handed policies.   
For some initial assurance, recall that in the case of anti-obesity legislation, 
principled lines exist to prevent such legislation from becoming all-encompassing. 
Specifically, anti-obesity policies will be justified if they are supported by either 
non-paternalistic or soft paternalistic reasons, they promise to be effective in 
reducing obesity, and they do not carry with them countervailing costs sufficient to 
destroy their benefits.243 In contrast, measures supported only on hard paternalism 
grounds will not be justified unless they come within the very narrow “defense of 
integrity” exception.244 Thus, highly intrusive policies such as bans and the rationing 
of popular comfort foods would be prohibited in principle.   
Nonetheless, many assume that such principled lines would be ignored and that 
any sort of government anti-obesity regulation would inevitably lead to ever-more 
intrusive and burdensome regulations later.245 This argument seems fanciful. 
Notably, the government is already deeply involved in the food industry in numerous 
ways; for example, in regulating food safety. Anti-obesity regulations would hardly 
be the government‟s first foray into the food industry; thus, approving such policies 
would not create a vast new sphere of government regulation. Consequently, the 
mere approval of some government anti-obesity policies would not open the flood 
gates to all sorts of intrusive food regulations. Indeed, the government has been 
regulating what Americans eat for years, and such a parade of horrible has not yet 
occurred. 
Moreover, implementing any of the anti-obesity policies advocated in this Article 
would not create a great risk of draconian food regulations later on. Consider the 
various educational and “full-disclosure” policies previously discussed. Once the 
government requires nutritional and caloric information to be clearly and effectively 
communicated, further action would not seem to be required on this front; thus, there 
appears to be little risk of educational and full-disclosure laws becoming 
increasingly more intrusive. 
Subsidies and taxes might be thought to be the types of policies giving rise to the 
greatest risk of indefensible regulatory expansion. Once the propriety of taxing 
unhealthy foods is accepted, one might worry that tax rates would steadily increase 
to the point where a Twinkie costs $20, $200, or even $2000. Even with taxes, 
however, there is little cause for concern of out of control regulation. As discussed 
earlier, principled reasons argue against the excessive taxation of unhealthy foods. 
Doing so would constitute unacceptable hard paternalism.   
Although such principles might be ignored, it seems unlikely that Americans 
would support such “excessive” taxes. While some interest groups may push for an 
increasingly aggressive level of taxation, they would have to overcome the powerful 
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(and much better funded) food lobby interest groups on the other side; this would be 
difficult without the support of the public. While concededly there is some risk that 
taxes on unhealthy foods could get out of control, this is a risk associated with all 
taxes. Any type of tax may be increased to unjustified levels. For example, it is 
conceivable that average income taxes could rise to 70, 80, 90, or even 100%. The 
mere possibility of such abuse hardly seems a convincing reason not to impose an 
income tax. Unless it can be shown that fat taxes specifically carry a great risk of 
abuse, the argument against such taxes is unconvincing.    
Finally, are the anti-obesity policies advocated in this Article likely to lead to 
complete bans of unhealthy foods? Such a scenario seems unlikely. Such bans are 
not supported by any significant segment of the American public. In addition, 
product bans appear unlikely to gain widespread support in the future because 
Americans will likely continue to enjoy the pleasures associated with eating 
unhealthy foods. Moreover, a future ban would have to overcome the powerful 
interests of the food lobby. For all of these reasons, future bans of popular products 
should not be a pressing cause for concern.   
In conclusion, the causal slippery slope argument appears to have little to show 
for it. The idea that implementing rather modest anti-obesity policies would lead to 
such heavy-handed policies as food bans and criminal penalties appears to be rather 
fantastic. There is no clear explanation that would bring about the slippage, and it is 
not clear why the principled limits to food regulation would not prevent the 
unjustified expansion of the government‟s anti-obesity mandate.246 In sum, the causal 
slippery slope argument seems to be little more than fear-mongering. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The American obesity crisis is responsible for staggering social costs, including 
at least 160,000 deaths per year, heavy physical and psychological costs, and an 
estimated $215 billion a year in economic expenses.247 Given that the government is 
the best-placed actor to address the problem, there seems to be a very strong prima 
facie case for government intervention. As we have seen, however, there is a major 
objection. Specifically, critics argue that government anti-obesity legislation 
constitutes unjustified government paternalism; therefore, the government is thought 
to lack the right to implement anti-obesity polices.248 
Although the paternalism objection establishes important limits to government 
intervention,249 it cannot be seen to proscribe all government anti-obesity measures. 
First, many anti-obesity policies, often incorrectly thought to be paternalistic, are in 
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fact nothing of the sort, and can be justified entirely on non-paternalistic grounds. 
Second, even some policies that are genuinely paternalistic can nonetheless be 
justified on soft paternalistic grounds.250 Indeed, several anti-obesity policies based 
upon either non-paternalistic or soft paternalistic grounds are justified. For example, 
full disclosure laws, advertising restrictions, healthy food subsidies, and “fat taxes.”   
The government would be wise to implement such policies because they promise 
real progress in the war on obesity. In doing so, policymakers need not pay much 
attention to the so-called slippery slope argument, as the risk of slippage is in reality 
more chimerical than real. Moreover, there are severe costs associated with doing 
nothing. As long as the government fails to directly address the obesity crisis, more 
Americans will die from obesity-related conditions, more Americans will suffer 
debilitating physical and psychological impediments, and substantial economic 
resources will be lost. There is no principled reason for the government not to 
become involved in the war on obesity, and such intervention promises great 
benefits. The time for action is now. 
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